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Abstract 
As part of a wider process of economic integration and the move towards a single integrated 
economic market, Australia and New Zealand entered into bi-lateral treaty in 2008 in order to 
resolve existing issues with the reciprocal enforcement of civil judgment which had arisen 
between the two countries. Labelled the “Christchurch Agreement” this treaty was incorporated 
by both countries into their domestic law in 2010 and now governs the allocation of disputes 
between Australia and New Zealand, where the parties are  located within the common market of 
Australia and New Zealand and inter-state enforcement of civil judgments more generally. The 
Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) and (NZ) (“TTPA”), will arguably provide significant 
benefits by reducing barriers to trade and improving the economic prosperity of both countries. 
However it is argued that, similar to other common market reciprocal enforcement schemes (such 
as the Brussels Model in the European Union), Australia and New Zealand failed to consider the 
impact of the outer world problem. The outer world problem is a recurring theme in common 
market arrangements, and results from a failure to provide generic proportionate jurisdictional 
test for cases involving foreign defendants sued in a common market state. The result is excessive 
jurisdictional rules within a particular state can potentially result in proceedings being retained 
where there is a strong argument the dispute is more closely connected with another forum. The 
resulting judgment (should judgment in the plaintiff’s favour be granted), can then be quickly 
enforced throughout the common market (specifically New Zealand) to the disadvantage of the 
defendant. The outer world problem is clearly present under the TTPA scheme, beginning in 
Australia and cumulating in enforcement of the judgment in New Zealand. It remains present 
even in the case of international commercial contract disputes. This is unfair and discriminatory 
towards foreign defendants, and arguably justifies reform, or at least discussion and justification 
of this approach.   
Keywords: private international law, Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010, outer world problem, 
jurisdiction, enforcement of foreign judgments 
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I Introduction 
A Presence of the Outer World Problem under the TTPA 
 
One-of-the-fundamental-precepts-of the common law has been to ensure that disputes are 
resolved in a manner where both (or all) parties are treated in a fair and even handed manner 
by the legal system tasked with resolving their dispute.1 Legislation which favours a 
particular party in a dispute (or is discriminatory in the sense that it legally treats one party 
differently to the other based on their nationality or race) should be based on sound and 
coherent reasoning. This criterion provides a useful sounding board when scrutinising the 
significant changes which have come about in relation to the reciprocal enforcement of 
foreign judgments across both sides of the Tasman.2  In late 2013 the Trans-Tasman 
Proceedings Act 2010 (NZ) came into force in New Zealand and marks a significant 
departure from the abovementioned principle.3 In particular the reciprocal enforcement 
regime established by the TTPA is, from the defendant’s perspective “nothing short of 
scandalous” because of the “harsh and discriminatory treatment” of defendants located 
outside of the common  market.4 The impetus-for-the-TTPA-was giving force to a bilateral 
agreement entered into between New Zealand and Australia in 2008 as part of a wider 
process to remedy issues  with the then existing  judgment enforcement regime between the 
two nations.5 Mirror incorporating legislation has been passed in Australia in order to give 
effect to the Christchurch Agreement.6 The issues with the TTPA scheme have arguably 
arisen as a result of the outer world problem. 
B Definition   
 
                                               
1 See Black v Taylor [1993] 3 NZLR 403 (CA). at 408-409 per Richardson  J; “The right to a fair hearing in the 
Courts is an elementary but fundamental principle of British justice. It reflects the historical insistence of the 
common law that disputes be settled in a fair, open and even-handed way (emphasis added).” 
2 For an overview of these changes see Reid Mortensen “A Trans-Tasman Judicial Area: Civil Jurisdiction and 
Judgments in the Single Economic Market” (2010) 16 Canta LR 61.  
3 Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (NZ). For the mirror Australian incorporating legislation see the Trans-
Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) (the “TTPA” collectively unless referred to otherwise).  
4 A Briggs and P Rees Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (2nd ed, LLP, 1997) at 311. 
5 Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of New Zealand on Trans-Tasman 
Court Proceedings and Regulatory Enforcement (done at Christchurch 24 July 2008) (“Christchurch 
Agreement”). For a useful overview of other issues the Christchurch Agreement was intended to remedy see 
Mortensen above n 2, at 61-65.  
6 See footnote 3.  
6 
 
The “outer world”-problem is not-a new one with respect to common market arrangements. 
Mortensen notes that similar-issues-have-arisen-in-the-context-of-the-single-market-of-the 
European-Union,7 and-have-been-subject-to-vehement-academic-criticism-as-far-back-as-the 
original-inception-of-the-Brussels-Convention-in 1968.8 Unsurprisingly the outer world 
problem involves outer world judgments. Outer world judgments are judgments-made-by-a-
court-which-have-extra-territorial-effect, by-determining-the liability (or absence thereof) of 
a foreign subject.9  
The-problem-of-outer-world judgments-arises-under-a-reciprocal judgment enforcement 
regime within a common market area, where-there is no-curtailment-of-domestic-based 
jurisdictional laws or rules. This allows market area courts to exercise-excessive jurisdiction 
with respect to-defendants located-outside-of the common market, subject to that forums 
private international law rules.10 Under-such regimes, there-will-be-limits-placed-on the-
ability-of-the-plaintiff-to-have-proceedings-against-other-parties-within-the-market-area 
resolved-in-whatever-state-they-choose.11 No-such protection-is-offered-to foreign 
defendants – any domestic statute (or Court rules-based) conferred-jurisdiction (no matter 
how exorbitant) will be sufficient to provide a basis for the plaintiff to commence 
proceedings.  
This allows the plaintiff to commence proceedings against the foreign defendant anywhere 
within the common market area – the only limit being any domestic private international law 
within the-particular-state or-jurisdiction which controls what cases the court addressed 
hears. To the extent these laws facilitate forum bias or incentivise forum shopping, the 
foreign defendant is put at a severe disadvantage in arguing that there case should be heard in 
another forum.12 Assuming the court then decides to hear the case and enters judgment in the 
plaintiff’s favour, the reciprocal judgment regime will then mean that this judgment becomes 
automatically enforceable throughout the entire market area.13 The plaintiff is able to access 
the assets of the foreign defendant anywhere within that common market area, under the 
applicable enforcement regime. 
                                               
7 Mortensen, above n 2, at 90-91.  
8 See K Nadelmann “The Outer World and the Common Market Experts’ Draft Convention on the Recognition 
of Judgments” (1968) 5 CML Rev 409.  
9 Mortensen, above n 2, at 90-91.  
10 Ibid at 90.  
11 Ibid.  
12 See the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth), ss 17-19.  
13 Subject to a few exceptions e.g. see the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (NZ), s 61, Trans-Tasman 
Proceedings Act (Cth), s 72 as an example.   
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C Overview   
The key argument which will be made is that the outer world problem is present under the 
TTPA scheme, and arises in Australia because of the high chance of retention of cases where 
a foreign defendant is a party when compared to New Zealand.14 This can be seen with 
reference to established criteria which makes up the problem, as sourced from various 
academic discussions on the issue. All these elements are satisfied, specifically that the TTPA 
scheme regulates forum issues for common market residents, and fails to do so for non-
common market residents, which results in Australia’s private international law being 
applicable when resolving the issue of the most appropriate forum to hear the dispute in cases 
where proceedings have been filed in Australia against a foreign defendant. It will be argued 
that the current state of its law in this respect is patently biased towards retaining such 
proceedings (including in cases involving commercial contractual disputes).15 Finally, where 
the Australian court resolves to retain the case, and, in the event it gives judgment in favour 
of the plaintiff, this is readily enforceable in New Zealand under the Trans-Tasman 
Proceedings Act 2010 (NZ), with little scope for challenge. Ultimately it will be argued this 
result in significant unfairness to the defendant, and any advantages for the plaintiff can be 
argued to less than persuasive. This unfairness justifies reform, albeit what form that it should 
take is a difficult issue with some tentative solutions being offered. Ultimately a more 
thorough review of the TTPA scheme in light of the outer world problem is recommended, 
something which did not occur as part of the review process carried out by an inter-
government panel over the course of 2005-2008.      
In many respects the TTPA and the Christchurch Agreement marks a positive move towards 
greater economic integration and trust between two nations with a long-standing history of 
friendship and close political ties.16 The outcome will arguably be the growth of trade and, in 
the round, a positive development for both countries. This must inevitably be kept in mind 
when highlighting any issues with the TTPA. However the present issue of the outer world 
problem and its position under the TTPA is one, on face value, easily remedied.  The 
misalignment of New Zealand and Australian private international law rules highlights our 
                                               
14 See footnote 43.  
15 Excluding cases involving non-exclusive choice of court agreements however.  
16 J L R Davis “Closer Economic Relations – A Trans-Tasman Confederation?” (2010) 16 Canta LR 47 at 47.  
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partner’ existing “forum-biased” approach to resolving international disputes as the cause of 
the outer world problem.17 
This arises from the combined effect of the dual incorporating pieces of legislation. On the 
one hand, the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) proportionate jurisdictions 
(contained within s 19 of the Act), do not apply where a defendant is arguing that a forum 
outside the common market (i.e. New Zealand and Australia) is the more appropriate one.18 
The default applicable regime is therefore the domestic private international law of Australia, 
in cases where the plaintiff has commenced proceedings in that forum against a foreign 
defendant.19 The current state of Australia’s private international law means that it is highly 
likely that the court addressed will retain proceedings commenced properly in that forum, 
even where there is a strong case that another forum is the more appropriate one.20 There is 
the potential that in some cases the Australian court will, having decided to retain the 
proceedings, then give judgment in favour of the plaintiff. These cases are the focus of this 
paper.  
The Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (NZ) does apply when it comes to the question of 
enforcing this resulting judgment, even though it fails to regulate the issue of forum.21 In 
general the judgment (obtained under the domestic private international law of Australia) will 
become automatically enforceable throughout the entire common market.22 This meets all the 
criteria of the outer world problem, as noted by various academics, such as Mortensen.23  
D Outer World Problem and Commercial Contract Disputes 
 
A key point of discussion for the purposes of this paper is the impact that commercial 
contract disputes will have on the outer world problem. In some cases, such disputes will be 
                                               
17 See Mortensen above n 2, at 90-91, Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc v Fay (1988) 165 CLR 197 
(HCA) at 238, 240, 247-248, 266 per Brennan, Deane and Gauldron JJ,  rejecting the English House of Lords 
approach to forum conveniens in Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd [1987] 1 AC 460 (HL). In the 
later Australian High Court decision in Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538 (HCA), the 
Oceanic position was expressly approved at 572.   
18 See footnotes 50-56.  
19 See footnotes 57-61.  
20 See footnotes 62 -134.  
21 See footnote 146.  
22 See footnotes 147-161.  
23 See footnote 40.  
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regulated by a choice of court agreement in the contract.24 The parties will have pre-arranged 
the forum in which there dispute is to be heard at the time of contract formation. Therefore, 
the issue of which forum (Australia or the foreign defendant’s preferred choice of forum) is 
the more appropriate one will have already been resolved by the parties. The issue of bias 
potentially does not arise, because the parties will have pre-regulated the issue of forum. A 
party may seek to challenge such a clause, and this is where forum bias arises under 
Australian private international law.  
The defendant can hardly claim they have been treated unfairly when they are required to 
defend proceedings in a pre-arranged forum. Arguably then there is no need (at least in the 
context of commercial contractual disputes) for reform.  However this ignores the reality that 
in Australia (where the outer world issue arises), courts retain ultimate discretion as to 
whether to uphold the parties choice of court agreement where one party has challenged.25 
Such a position also ignores the types of clauses which could be present in a commercial 
contract, with respect to the issue of forum, and the impact this will have on the applicable 
legal test when the court must decide where the dispute is heard. Under Australia’s existing 
case law, a high degree of forum retention in breach of such agreements further highlights the 
need for reform, or at least discussion of the outer world problem.26 In cases where there is no 
choice of court clause in the agreement, the contractual dispute will be regulated under 
conventional forum non conveniens principles.27 The importance of discretionary tests such 
the doctrine of forum non conveniens, as the gateway through which proceedings are 
allocated remains present for commercial contract disputes.   
E The Outer World: a problem at all?  
 
                                               
24 For pre-TTPA New Zealand authority on the relevancy of choice of court clauses in  resolving the issue of the 
appropriate forum see Bramwell v The Pacific Lumber Co Ltd (1986) 1 PRNZ 307 (HC), Air Nauru v Niue Air 
Lines Ltd [1993] 2 NZLR 632 (HC), Society of Lloyd’s & Oxford Members’ Agency Ltd v Hyslop [1993] 3 
NZLR 135 (HC). The position for TTPA cases is now governed by the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 
(NZ), s 25, Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth), s 20.  
25 As a general statement this would appear to be incorrect pre-TTPA – these three cases all establish that New 
Zealand Court’s retain a residual jurisdiction even where there is a choice of forum clause which submits to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of a particular forum (see cases at footnote 9). See David Goddard QC and Campbell 
McLachlan QC “Private International Law – litigating in the trans-Tasman context and beyond” (paper 
presented to NZLS CLE conference, August 2012) at 51. In terms of Australia the position is the same, see Akai 
Pty Ltd v People's Insurance Co Ltd 188 CLR 418 (HCA) at 428, Kingston Estate Wines Pty Ltd v Vetreria 
Etrusca Srl [2007] SADC 102 at [24]-[25].  
26 Mortenson, above n 2, at 81.  
27 See as a New Zealand example Longbeach Holdings Ltd v Bhanabhai & Company Ltd CA Wellington 
CA11/93 6 Dec 1993, for Australia see Contractors Ltd v MTE Control Gear Ltd [1964] SASR 47 (SC) at 50.  
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A point of contention is to what extent the outer world problem is a “problem” at all. Self-
evidently the key issue is fairness towards the parties, and what (if any) unfairness is caused 
to the defendant by the problem balanced against the advantages in terms of enforcement 
received by the plaintiff. There are a number of potential arguments. These include the 
unfairness the TTPA causes to defendants (specifically those who are foreign) by failing to 
regulate the issue of the most appropriate forum,28 which is further compounded by the 
manner in which the Australian judgment then becomes automatically enforceable throughout 
the common market. From the defendant’s perspective, the real unfairness of the outer world 
problem is manifested in the ability of the plaintiff to access their assets (via the reciprocal 
enforcement regime) in New Zealand. Other issues may also include the purpose of the 
Christchurch agreement and the TTPA regime, which was (arguably) to facilitate the 
enforcement of judgments against common market residents and business owners rather than 
judgments against foreign defendants.29   
Counter arguments might include that fairness issues raised by the relationship between the 
TTPA and Australia’s private international law merely systemic of arguments around 
whether the role of private international law is to prevent forum shopping.30 The outer world 
problem is a prime example of forum shopping, as the plaintiff will seek to have their claim 
against the defendant resolved in that state because of advantages from the substantive and 
procedural law of that forum, as well as other factors.31  Independent of appropriate forum 
issues, there is the further question of the impact that international commercial contracts will 
have on the question of fairness to the defendant, as the parties can elect forum which will 
resolve the dispute. This also needs to be addressed. 
F Reform 
 
                                               
28 See footnote 163-174.  
29 Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (NZ), s 3(1)(b), Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth), s 3(b), 
Trans-Tasman Working Group, Trans-Tasman Court Proceedings and Regulatory Enforcement: A Report by 
the Trans-Tasman Working Group (Ministry of Justice, December 2006), at 9-12.  
30 See Brian R Opeskin “The Price of Forum Shopping: A Reply to Professor Juenger” (1994) 16  Syd LR 14 at 
21-22, compare F K Juenger “What’s Wrong With Forum Shopping” (1994) 16 Syd LR 1 at 10-11. 
31 Andrew S Bell Forum Shopping and Venue in Transnational Litigation (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2003) at 25.  
11 
 
If it is accepted that reform is justified because of the unfair treatment of the defendant under 
the outer world problem, then how would this be achieved?32  Additionally international 
commercial contractual arrangements raise different issues, and therefore approaches to 
reform as opposed to cases resolved under conventional forum non conveniens principles.33 
Legislative reform of the TTPA (Cth) could be one solution however this raises a number of 
issues.34 Another option could be court led reform by aligning the current private 
international of New Zealand and Australia. The current position in New Zealand in terms of 
conventional forum non conveniens applications (i.e. where there is no choice of court 
clause) is governed by the House of Lords decision of Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex 
Ltd.35 The alignment of New Zealand and Australian private international law could provide 
one solution to the outer world problem, without raising the need to deal with the 
enforcement issues under the TTPA.36 However this would require Australia to overrule its 
current approach to forum non conveniens applications and adopt the test in Spiliada.37 
Forum non conveniens (latin: forum not convenient) is a well-known discretionary principle 
utilised by most common law systems as a means of controlling the kinds of disputes a forum 
will hear (based on how closely connected they are with that forum). Courts may rule 
themselves or another forum “forum non conveniens” to hear the dispute by granting a stay 
of the proceedings, or refusing one.  This discretion sits above rules based jurisdictional rules 
which allow proceedings to be commenced and served against defendants located outside of 
                                               
32 Additionally it is argued that under established principles of international comity, Australian and New 
Zealand governments should have given greater consideration as to how the outer world problem under the 
TTPA might have been perceived by other countries, see footnote 162.  
33 See footnote 202-204.  
34 The intent of the TTPA was clearly to provide for a regime which would only apply in terms of disputes 
where the parties were from Australia or New Zealand (see Trans-Tasman Working Group, Trans-Tasman Court 
Proceedings and Regulatory Enforcement: A Report by the Trans-Tasman Working Group (Attorney General’s 
Department (Australia) Ministry of Justice (New Zealand), December 2006) at 10, Trans-Tasman Working 
Group, Trans-Tasman Court Proceedings and Regulatory Enforcement: A Public Discussion Paper by the 
Trans-Tasman Working Group (Attorney General’s Department (Australia) Ministry of Justice (New Zealand), 
August 2005), Trans-Tasman Proceedings Bill 105-2 (select-committee report), (23 March 2010)  661 NZPD 
9702,  (18 March 2010)  CAPD 2215 (Cth)), therefore amending incorporating legislation to apply to disputes 
where one of the parties is located outside of the common market contrary, to the intent of the original 
legislation, the Christchurch agreement, and the underlying purpose of the legislation (which was to facilitate 
trade between the Australia and New Zealand, not other countries, see New Zealand Treasury, Regulatory 
Impact Statement – Implementation of Recommendations of Trans-Tasman Working Group on Court 
Proceedings and Regulatory Enforcement (New Zealand Treasury, November 2009) at 1).  
35 Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd, above n 17, Bomac Laboratories Ltd v Life Medicals (MSDN BHD) 
[2012] NZHC 363 at [8].  
36 This option would mean that at least concerns of fairness to the defendant in terms of enforcement of the 
Australian judgment in New Zealand, under the TTPA, would be mitigated, because the issue of forum in 
Australia would have (arguably) have been resolved in a more partisan manner. However see footnotes 62-134, 
similar issues in terms of bias under the Spiliada test could arise as under Australia’s current private 
international law.  
37 See Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd, above n 17.  
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the jurisdiction, and depending on the type of case, with or without the leave of the court. 
Australia and New Zealand both have these features present in their system of private 
international law – however where they differ is in terms of the willingness to grant stays. 
The Australian approach can be highlighted by a high degree of bias towards refusing stays, 
even where the case has a close connection with another forum. In contrast, the New Zealand 
approach under Spiliada, should theoretically result in a greater chance of a stay being 
granted in the same scenario, although some New Zealand cases would seem to indicate the 
opposite conclusion.38 
The House of Lords decision in Spiliada has also been subject to vehement academic 
criticism and raises its own issues as possible alternative to reform. The best approach is 
likely to be legislative reform, removing judgments against foreign defendants (obtained 
under the private international law of Australia) from the expedited process for enforcement 
in New Zealand under the TTPA as this addresses the issue of fairness to the defendant but 
avoids other issues which arise from alternative methods of reform .39  
II Outer World Problem under the TTPA 
A Introduction  
 
That the outer-world problem-is-present-under-the TTPA can be seen by analysing the 
legislative regime which incorporates the Christchurch Agreement. Mortensen (and other 
academics) conception of the outer world problem can be broken down into four key 
elements:40 
1. The common market regime regulates forum issues where parties are closely 
connected with common market, and disputing between particular state(s) within the 
common market as to which is the appropriate forum;41  
                                               
38 See footnote 42.  
39 See Anthony Gray “Forum Non Conveniens in Australia: A Comparative Analysis” (2009) 38 CLWR 207, at 
214-219, 228-230.  
40 Mortensen, above n 2, at 90-91, K Nadelmann “Clouds Over International Efforts to Unify Rules of Conflicts 
of Laws” (1977) 41 LCP 54 at 58-62, M Pryles and FA Trindade “The Common Market (EEC) Convention on 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters – Possible Impact Upon Australian 
Citizens” (1974) 48 ALJ 185 at 193-194.   
41 The purpose of breaking down the outer world problem into elements is to distil key features for the purpose 
of identifying to what extent the outer world problem arises under the TTPA. This first element raises a number 
of definitional issues however, as the extent to which the legislation applies (or does not apply) to legal disputes 
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2. The common market regime fails to regulate forum issues in the case of foreign 
defendants who are not closely connected with the common market; 
 
3. The domestic private international law of the common market state addressed, 
compared to the common market arrangements, is biased towards retaining 
proceedings in that state where they have been commenced (e.g. despite the fact that 
the link between the dispute and that forum may be tenuous); and 
 
4. The common market provides for a streamlined reciprocal enforcement regime of 
civil judgments (whether or not the liable parties dispute was regulated by the 
common market forum allocation test)).  
 
B TTPA: Outer World Problem   
1 Common Market Regulates Forum Issues  
 
                                                                                                                                                  
with a connection to the common market depends on the frame of reference with reference to the party’s 
connection to the market. For example, Mortensen’s articulation of the of the first element of the outer world 
problem focuses on the fact that the TTPA regime will only apply to parties where they are served within the 
common market (see Mortensen, above n 2, at 90-91), which is correct – see footnotes 52 and 54). But this 
would appear to be over simplistic as clearly not all parties who might have been served within the common 
market (i.e. physically present) will be permanent or long-term residents there, or have a business presence there 
(see Mortensen, above n 2, at 90-91). If one of the key issues in terms of the outer world problem is that it 
results in discrimination of foreign defendants in how they are treated vis common market residents when 
resolving the issue of forum, then surely a definition must clearly articulate to what extent the legislation does or 
does not apply to parties that do or do not have a close connection with the common market. However 
alternative definitions to whether the legislation just applies to those served within the common market also 
raise difficulties – for example defining the outer world problem with reference to nebulous concepts such as 
whether the parties have a “connection” with the common market provides insufficient guidance with reference 
to the issue of whether the outer world problem is present under the common market regime. The better 
approach  would appear to be focus on established private international law principles when considering 
whether a party has a close connection with a particular  forum, namely whether they are domiciled in that state.  
Again such a concept is equally nebulous and depends closely on the facts of the particular dispute, making it 
difficult to generalise (see Ellwood v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2012] AATA 869, at [18]-[26]).   
 
For present purposes a definition which delineates between parties which are merely present in the common 
market and those which have a closer connection in the sense they may have resided there for a lengthy period 
of time or carry out business there / have a business presence within the common market provides a useful 
starting point. Again this definition is less than convincing but at least addresses the issue raised by Mortensen’s 
definition, namely focusing on whether the party is physically present in the common market is misleading as it 
does not fully determine whether the party has a meaningful (or lack of meaningful) connection with the 
common market, specifically Australia.  
14 
 
(a) Legislative scheme  
 
Taking-the first element of the outer world problem, and the-Australian-legislation (where-
the-outer-world-problem begins),42 proceedings are-commenced-by-way-of-service-of an 
initiating document43 on-the-other-party.44 The-originating-process (as-long-as-it-is-served-
in-accordance-with-the-TTPA), has-the-same effect-and-gives-rise-to-the-same-proceedings-
as-if they-had-been-served-in-Australia.45 The defendant-then-has-two-options. They-may 
                                               
42 For the purpose of this paper the author has focused on how the outer problem arises where proceedings are 
commenced in Australia against a foreign defendant, and the resulting judgment is sought to be enforced in New 
Zealand as opposed to the reverse position (i.e. proceedings commenced in New Zealand against a foreign 
defendant, and then the judgment is sought to be enforced in Australia). This is where the “outer world 
problem” arises under the TTPA regime, because of the domestic private international law of Australia is biased 
towards retaining proceedings commenced against a party to a dispute, despite there being a strong argument 
that another forum is the appropriate one based on the particular facts of the case (see footnotes 62-134). Ease of 
enforcement of any resulting judgment in New Zealand (although the practical reason the foreign defendant 
cares about the outer world problem), alone arguably causes no unfairness to the foreign defendant (see footnote 
164). Logically therefore the focus in the balance of the paper will be on the Australian legislation (i.e. the 
Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) in terms of forum allocation at the commencement stage of the 
proceedings, and then the New Zealand legislation (i.e. the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (NZ) when it 
comes to the issue of enforcing the Australian judgment in New Zealand. 
 
Arguably the problem does not arise in the reverse scenario, because of the applicable domestic private 
international law (which applies as the default regime regulating the issue of forum allocation in the absence of 
another regime applying e.g. the TTPA), is not biased towards retaining proceedings commenced in New 
Zealand. See Mortensen, above n 2, at 90-91. Mortensen’s conception of the outer world problem focuses on the 
fact that the leading forum non conveniens case in New Zealand (the English House of Lords decision in 
Spiliada) is the touchstone for reform, on the basis that the test balances the parties interests vis the issue of 
forum more fairly than current Australian arrangements (i.e. his suggestion for reform would be that the 
Australian legislatures or High Court mandate the application of Spiliada as opposed to the current leading test 
test in Voth). His solution is predicated on the basis that current problem under the TTPA can be remedied by 
aligning the private international law of both common market countries so that all disputes are subject to a more 
balanced test.  However recent New Zealand case law on forum non conveniens applications indicates that New 
Zealand courts may well be much closer to Australian courts in terms of their approach to allocating forum than 
the different tests would indicate. See for example the recent New Zealand High Court decision in Bomac 
Laboratories Ltd v Life Medicals, above n 35, at [8]-[30], where a stay was refused on the basis that Malaysia 
was not the more appropriate forum to resolve the dispute, in circumstances where the connecting factors (e.g. 
witness location, comparative expense of trial in New Zealand versus Malaysia) pointed towards the dispute 
being more closely connected with that forum rather than New Zealand. Ultimately an application for a stay was 
refused by the High Court on review (at [33]). The illustrates the point that despite New Zealand private 
international law being arguably more “balanced” because of the legal test applied when hearing applications for 
a stay (at least on face value), because of a large amount of discretion under such tests there is scope for bias to 
arise through the manner in which individual judges resolve particular cases e.g. in the way they interpret 
specific factors or balance them.  This point was expressly made by the High Court in Bomac (albeit in the 
context of commenting on the High Court’s role when reviewing the decision of an Associate Judge of the High 
Court, at [20]). A fuller analysis of whether the outer world problem arises in both New Zealand as well is 
beyond the scope of this paper, although the problems identified by the Bomac approach will later be discussed 
when it comes to the issue of reform of the TTPA.  
43 Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth), s 4, definition of “initiating document”.   
44 Section 9.  
45 Section 10.  
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either file an appearance46 or apply for a stay of the Australian proceedings on the grounds 
that a New Zealand Court is the more appropriate forum, within 30 days of being served with 
the originating process, under s 17.47 The TTPA provides for a list of non-exhaustive factors 
in s 19 which must be taken into account by the Australian court when determining whether 
to grant a stay under s 17.48 Section 19 is the pivotal section in terms of the issue of resolving 
the issue of forum. Section 19 explicitly states that it only applies to an application for a stay 
under s 17. Section 17 of the Australian legislation provides that: 
(1)  A defendant in a civil proceeding in an Australian court may apply to the court 
for an order staying the proceeding on the grounds that a New Zealand court is the 
more appropriate court to determine the matters in issue. 
(2)  The application must be made within: 
(a)  30 working days of the Australian court after the day on which the 
defendant was served with the initiating document for the proceeding; or 
… (emphasis added)  
The TTPA does not explicitly state that it applies to disputes between parties resident or 
closely connected with the respective common markets state.49 However the legislation will 
apply where the parties are physically present within the common market and are arguing 
between whether New Zealand or Australia is the more appropriate forum. The former point 
will generally mean that the defendant will need to have been physically present in the 
common market for the test in section 19 to apply – the latter that they have a close 
connection with the forum as per element one of the definition of outer world problem, 
outlined above. 
This first point is made clear from the scheme of service under the legislation. Service of an 
initiating document must be made on parties located within the common market in 
accordance with the relevant rules of Court in the place in which proceedings were issued.50 
Section 9 envisages (under the Australian legislation / court rules) that the defendant will 
                                               
46 Section 13.  
47 Section 17.  
48 Section 19.  
49 See the discussion at footnote 58 – for example the legislation is not expressly limited to parties which are 
domiciled within Australia or New Zealand – see Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth), Trans-Tasman 
Proceedings Act 2010 (NZ).  
50 Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth), s 9(2)(a).  
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have been served in New Zealand, based on the express wording of the section.51  In most 
Australian courts, service of the originating process will generally require personal service on 
the defendant where they are a natural person.52 In terms of other defendants (e.g. 
corporations, partnerships), the court rules in the various Australian states and territories 
provide for different means of service. Generally service can occur via serving the originating 
process on the president or some other head officer, or the director of the corporation, in 
accordance with the provisions of the federal Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).53 Under that Act a 
corporation (i.e. companies and incorporated societies) may also be served with the 
originating process either via post or personal service at the registered office of the 
corporation.54 As service of the initiating document under s 9 is a pre-requisite before the 
defendant can apply for a stay under ss 17 / 19,55 the service scheme indicates that the 
                                               
51 Ibid.  
52 Section 9(1)-(2) make it clear that to effect service of the originating process on the defendant present within 
New Zealand, this must be done in accordance with the relevant rules of court in the “place of issue” (which 
means, in relation to an initiating document or subpoena issued by an Australian court or tribunal, the State or 
Territory in which the court or tribunal issued the document), section 4 definition of “place of issue”. An 
initiating document is defined as a document by which a civil proceeding is commenced in an Australian court 
or tribunal; or by reference to which a person becomes a party to a civil proceeding in an Australian court or 
tribunal. Generally all Australian states and territories (in terms of the relevant civil court rules) require personal 
service on a natural defendant to effect the originating process (i.e. personal service is effected by personally 
delivering and leaving a copy of the document with the defendant in the event they refuse to accept service), see 
Bernard Cairns, Australian Civil Procedure (10th ed, Thomas Reuters, Sydney, 2014) at 4.20. Originating 
process is used to refer to the document which must be filed in the relevant court and served on the defendant to 
commence the proceedings. Because service of the originating process must be carried out personally on the 
defendant within New Zealand (in accordance with Australian civil court rules) with respect to natural persons 
and therefore they will have to be at least physically present within the jurisdiction for the legislation 
(particularly the test in s 19) to apply to their civil dispute.  
53 Bernard Cairns, above n 55, at [4.30]. See [4.50] for partnerships (generally personal service on the partner or 
a person who manages the partnerships business, at their principle place of business and containing a notice 
which indicates what capacity the person is being served in i.e. manager or partner).  
54 Similar to natural defendants, corporations will generally need to be physically located within New Zealand to 
be served under s 9. To be served at its office, the company will need to have been incorporated under the laws 
of New Zealand to have a registered office or be carrying on business within New Zealand (see Companies Act 
1993 (NZ), s 334(1)). Personal service on company officers or other head officers however creates a potential 
argument that the TTPA could be utilised to serve proceedings on companies with no physical presence within 
the common market (other than the officer being fortuitously present within New Zealand), and therefore the 
ability to commence proceedings under the TTPA where the defendant corporation has little connection with the 
common market. This will be discussed further below (see footnote 59 ).    
55Section 17(2(a) corroborates the point that, despite the ambiguity in s 17 as to whether the scheme could apply 
to non-common market defendants, the TTPA scheme was intended to only regulate disputes where the parties 
were located within the common market. This can be seen by analysing the surrounding context of s 17. An 
application for a stay under s 17 must be made within 30 working days after the day on which the defendant was 
served with an initiating document.  An initiating document is one which commences the proceedings in an 
Australian court, in the prescribed form.  Section 9 provides that an initiating document may be served in New 
Zealand without leave of the Australian Court, which issues the originating process. Clearly the drafters of the 
legislation envisaged that an application for a stay under s 17 would be made in cases where proceedings had 
been served under s 9, because of the express mention of service of “an initiating document” in section 17(2)(a) 
with reference to the timeframe the defendant has to apply for a stay under s 17. This would confirm that an 
application for a stay would only be made in cases where the defendant had been physically served with 
proceeding in New Zealand, meaning it would be likely they were a common market resident.  
17 
 
defendant (no matter what type of entity) will have to have been at least physically present 
within New Zealand for the TTPA to apply to their dispute.  
In terms of the second point, for the defendant to avail themselves of the relevant test under s 
19, s 17 also stipulates that they must be arguing that, as opposed to Australia (where the 
proceedings will have been commenced under s 9), New Zealand is the more appropriate 
forum. Logically it will generally be a defendant located within New Zealand who seeks to 
have the proceedings heard there.56 Although the service aspect of the legislation focuses on 
physical presence, the fact that the defendant must be arguing that New Zealand is the more 
appropriate forum (for the test in s 19 to apply) will generally mean that the legislation 
applies to parties with a close connection to the common market e.g. they will be physically 
present in the market and will be seeking to have the forum resolved in New Zealand.  
2 Common market fails to regulate forum issues for foreign defendant  
 
On face value the legislation appears ambiguous in terms of whether the test in s 19 applies 
just in cases where the defendant and plaintiff have a strong connection with the common 
market, or whether it applies to non-market residents or businesses as well, who have little / 
no connection with the common market. This ambiguity arises from the focus on service 
under the legislation, and what forum the defendant is arguing is more appropriate, rather 
than other well-known private international law concepts such as residence or domicile. For 
example s 17(1) indicates that that the section 19 test only applies where the defendant (who 
will logically be arguing for a stay),57 is arguing that New Zealand is the more appropriate 
forum. Additionally there is no express limit placed on whether the legislation applies to 
disputes where the parties are domiciled, nationals, or otherwise have a presence within the 
common market.58    So feasibly a non-resident or foreign business, might attempt to argue 
                                               
56 Goddard and  McLachlan, above n 25, at 15.  
57 If the defendant does not wish to oppose the plaintiff’s choice of forum (Australia) then the issue of the 
applicability of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) and the outer world problem does not arise. In 
such circumstances the defendant can hardly be heard to complain of any unfairness that arises from failing to 
oppose the plaintiff’s choice of forum.   
58 Common market regimes vary in terms of the manner in which they “apply” to legal disputes. For example 
the European Union “Brussels Model” cross-enforcement regime applies where the party is domiciled (for both 
individuals and companies, and other legal entities) within a state part of the European Union, with specialist 
jurisdictional rules developed to for particular disputes. The phrase “domiciled” is undefined in the regulations 
but, for example, has been defined in with reference to individuals by the incorporating United Kingdom 
legislation as residence in, and a substantial connection with, the United Kingdom (see Civil Jurisdiction and 
Judgments Act 1982 (UK), ss 41,42). A substantial connection is presumed after three months’ residence but 
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that because they will apply for a stay in favour of New Zealand being the more appropriate 
Court, section 17 applies to them. The better argument would appear to be that despite the 
ambiguities arising from service (e.g. the potential for residents and businesses to be served 
within the common market under Australian civil rules, despite the fact they are only 
temporarily present in the jurisdiction), the requirement that the defendant must be arguing 
that New Zealand is the more appropriate forum will generally make it highly unlikely that 
the legislation will apply to non-common market residents.59 Logically they will be arguing 
for a stay in favour of another forum, but the possibility of applying for a stay on these terms 
is impossible under s 17 / 19 the only alternative forum is New Zealand.60 Consequently 
element two of the outer world problem is clearly satisfied, as in all cases the test in s 19 will 
not apply unless the foreign defendant is (in most cases) physically present within New 
Zealand and is arguing New Zealand is the more appropriate forum when seeking a stay in 
accordance with s 17. It is highly unlikely a fact scenario would arise.61 Therefore in cases 
                                                                                                                                                  
this can be rebutted.  In terms of corporations or associations, the focus is on the location of the “seat of the 
corporation” (which is ascertained with reference to whether the company was formed under the law of a part of 
the United Kingdom and has its registered office or some other official address in the United Kingdom, or ). 
There are also special jurisdictional rules for certain types of proceedings. For example in the case of a 
contractual dispute, courts in the place where contractual obligations are performed have jurisdiction over 
contractual disputes. Again these rules apply even if the defendant is domiciled in another jurisdiction.  Some of 
these rules give non-exclusive jurisdiction to a court and others confer exclusive jurisdiction.  Whether a court 
can assume jurisdiction under a special rule involves deciding whether the proceeding is of a particular kind.  
Then any connecting factors specified in the rule must be applied. If, as is quite possible, courts in more than 
one State have jurisdiction, the model regulates priority between them on the basis that the court where 
proceedings first began has jurisdiction. See Regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L012. Such regimes provide a useful 
comparison in terms of how the TTPA regime could have been set-up to provide greater clarity around the issue 
of which disputes it applies to.  
59 Residents is used to refer to individuals – businesses (the focus of this paper) can of course include a sole 
trader and in this sense the way the legislation does or doesn’t apply to individuals directly impacts on the outer 
world problem and whether the first element of the problem is present under the TTPA with respect to 
commercial contractual or B2B contractual disputes (to some extent).  In terms of businesses (i.e. entities 
trading through a company or some other form of separate legal entity such as partnership or an incorporated 
society) the TTPA does not apply unless the business has a physical presence in New Zealand (in the form of a 
registered office), see footnotes 53-54. However there is potential for the business to be served in New Zealand 
despite the absence of any physical presence in the jurisdiction, under Australian civil rules relating to service. 
In terms of the definition of element two of the outer world problem, this would of course potentially mean the 
legislation could be argued to apply to foreign defendants with little / no connection to the common market, 
based on Australian civil court rules and the possibility for service under the TTPA to occur without any 
registered office or business presence in New Zealand (e.g. an officer of the company being fortuitously present 
in the jurisdiction). The better conclusion is that the application of the TTPA to a civil dispute where there is at 
least one party is located outside of the common market is highly unlikely, as it would still require the foreign 
business to then be arguing (in accordance with s 17) that New Zealand was the more appropriate forum, when 
they are much more likely to be arguing that another forum is the more appropriate one. From the foreign 
defendant’s perspective many of the issues with Australia being the forum to hear the dispute (e.g. costs 
associated with defending foreign disputes, travel costs, costs of witness disbursements, potential procedural 
disadvantages) are likely to arise in New Zealand as well, and it would therefore appear nonsensical that they 
would prefer New Zealand as the more appropriate forum and argue this when seeking a stay.  
60 Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010, ss 17, 19.  
61 See footnote 59.  
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where the foreign defendant has little connection with the common market, the TTPA 
(specifically the test in s 19), will not apply, and the case will be governed by the private 
international law of Australia.  
3 Domestic Private International Law of Australia is Biased  
 
(a) Introduction  
 
As noted by both Mortensen and Gray, Australia’s private international law is characterised 
by a high degree of forum bias in the sense that Australian courts are much more willing to 
retain proceedings properly commenced by a plaintiff within the jurisdiction, even where 
there is a strong connection with another forum.62 The issue of whether proceedings have 
been properly commenced (i.e. based on the forums jurisdictional rules), and whether the 
forum addressed should retain them (forum non conveniens) can be distinguished.63 Case law 
in this area further bifurcates the applicable principles for contractual disputes, as to whether 
the proceedings are governed by the doctrine of forum non conveniens (i.e. contractual 
disputes where there is no choice of court agreement or the choice of court agreement is non-
exclusive in the relevant contract) or an exclusive choice of court agreement (i.e. contractual 
disputes where there is a choice of court agreement in the relevant contract, and this is 
determined to have the legal consequence that the parties’ submit to the exclusive jurisdiction 
of a particular court within a particular forum).64  
                                               
62 Mortensen, above n 2, at 80-81, 85, Gray. above n 39, at 229-230.  
63 In the sense that the former is concerned with jurisdiction, the later with whether the forum addressed is the 
appropriate forum to hear the dispute (based on various factors relevant under the relevant legal test e.g. see 
Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd, above n 17, at 474, 854). The distinction is based on the 
development of common law systems in terms of the extraordinary jurisdiction (or jurisdiction relating to the 
ability of courts to exercise coercive power over foreign defendants located outside of that courts state). For 
present purposes it is sufficient to note that under a common law system a plaintiff can have commenced 
proceedings properly but still ultimately have the proceedings stayed in that forum on the basis that a court in 
another forum is the more appropriate one, based on discretionary tests (e.g. forum non conveniens) applied by 
courts to regulate the disputes it hears, see Gray, above n 39, at 10-11, Michael Karayanni “The Myth and 
Reality of a Controversy: “Public Factors” and the Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine” (2003) Wisconsin Int'l LJ 
327, at 342-343. Consequently in common law systems such tests play an important role when ascertaining 
whether the private international law of that forum is biased when retaining proceedings, as a court having 
jurisdiction to hear the dispute is not the definitive touchstone for whether the court ultimately hears this 
dispute. In a wider sense then, jurisdiction as a meaningful concept not only includes rules which stipulate the 
types of cases that a court can hear but also discretionary tests such as the principle of forum non conveniens, as 
the former is not the definitive test for whether the case is ultimately heard by the court.    
64 Mortensen, above n 2, at 85.  
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This bifurcation of principles is important to identify at the outset, as this clearly impacts on 
the extent to which it is possible to argue that Australia’s private international law is 
“biased”, with respect to international commercial contracts. For example, it is difficult to 
argue that in civil proceedings for a claim arising from a commercial contract, the private 
international law of Australia is “biased”,65 if say, the parties elected (in a choice of court 
agreement), that any dispute under their agreement was to be resolved in Australia.66 The 
issue of whether Australia’s private international law is biased is more complex than merely 
assessing one particular fact scenario. Further issues arise as to the efficacy of this argument, 
and these issues will be discussed with reference to the particular kinds of fact scenarios 
which might arise in the context of a commercial contractual disputes. Ultimately Australian 
private international law displays a strong level of bias towards retaining proceedings despite 
the potential for other factors to impact on the applicable test the court will apply when 
allocating forum.67   
(b) Forum Non Conveniens  
i. Introduction  
 
In the first scenario the international commercial contract will have no choice of court 
agreement. A choice of court agreement is a commonly used clause in commercial contracts 
between parties which are located in different states, in order to predetermine the issue of the 
court which will resolve their dispute.68 The absence of such a clause in the agreement 
impacts on the applicable legal test an Australian court when resolving the issue of the most 
appropriate forum to hear any dispute arising under the agreement. For conveniences sake 
these will be referred to as forum non conveniens cases.  
ii. Spiliada  
 
                                               
65 And therefore responsible for proceedings being retained within one jurisdiction.  
66 The logical argument is that the private international law of Australia can hardly be described as “biased” 
when it is merely giving effect to the ability of the parties to regulate their own affairs or private ordering.    
67 Mortensen, above n 2, a 72.  
68 Garnett defines such a clause as “… a provision in a contract whereby the parties agree to submit any disputes 
between them to a designated court.” See R Garnett, “Stay of Proceedings in Australia: A “Clearly 
Inappropriate” Test (1999) 23 MULR 30, at 62.  
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In-terms-of-forum-non-conveniens-cases, the-leading Australian High Court cases have 
diligently avoided adopting the test promulgated by the House of Lords in Spiliada for 
international cases.69 The approach in Spiliada provides a useful comparator in terms of 
analysing the extent to which Australia’s private international law is biased. As Gray notes, 
this is because the semantics of the tests and the role the court has in comparing the 
competing choices of forum differ under Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (the leading 
case under Australian private international law with respect to forum non conveniens cases) 
and Spiliada,. These differences highlight the bias under the Australia’s private international 
law.70  
The Spiliada forum non conveniens test can be characterised by the degree of proportionality 
it-offers to-both parties-when resolving the issue of the most appropriate forum.71 Under the 
test, a court has discretion to stay proceedings where there is some other available forum, 
having competent jurisdiction, which is the more appropriate forum for the trial of the action, 
namely one where the case me tried more suitably for the interests of all parties and the ends 
of justice.72  
The test is broken down into two steps,73 with the initial onus being on the defendant,74 to 
convince the court addressed that there is some other available forum of competent 
jurisdiction which is more closely connected to the parties’ dispute than that forum. In other 
words, it must be shown to the court addressed that a court of the alternative forum would 
assume jurisdiction over the case. In this respect, various factors are examined, with no single 
                                               
69 Gray, above n 39, at 214-219, Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Company Inc v Fay, above n 17, Regie 
National des Usines Renault SA v Zhang (2010) 210 CLR 575 (HCA), Dow Jones & Company Inc v Gutnick 
(2002) 210 CLR 575, Puttick v Teon Limited (2008) 238 CLR 265 at 267-7, 280. 
70 Gray, above n 39, at 227.  
71 Mortensen, above n 2, at 73-74.  
72 Spiliada Martime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd, above n 17, at 476.  
73 See L Collins Dicey Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws (15th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2012) 
at[12-029] – [12-046], A Briggs and P Rees, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (5th ed, Informa Law, 2009),  at 
[4.13].   
74 In some jurisdictions this test has been amended so that it  the onus remains on the plaintiff throughout both 
steps of the test e.g. see New Zealand, Wing Hung Printing Co Ltd v Saito Offshore Pty Ltd [2010] NZCA 502, 
[2011] 1 NZLR 754, High Court Rules 2014, r 6.29. Under Australian law and the test for a stay in Voth v 
Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd, the onus remains on the plaintiff where prior leave to serve the proceedings on a 
defendant located outside of the jurisdiction is required. The plaintiff must show under Voth that i) the action is 
connected to the forum in one of the ways specified in the applicable rules of court (e.g. in a contract action, that 
the contract was made or breached within the forum, or was governed by the law of the forum), and ii) that the 
forum is not a clearly inappropriate one to hear the matter. In contrast, in cases where prior leave was not 
required to serve proceedings outside of the jurisdiction, or where jurisdiction has been invoked as of right 
under the common law rules (e.g. physical, albeit temporary, presence in the jurisdiction), the onus lies on the 
defendant to prove that the Australian court is a clearly inappropriate forum to hear the dispute. See R Garnett, 
above n 68, at 37, Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd, above n 17, at 538, 564-565. 
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one necessarily being the decisive one. These factors typically include the degree to which 
the dispute and the events giving rise to their claim are connected with a particular forum and 
also the governing law of the parties’ dispute.75 Additionally the alternative court must have 
competent jurisdiction to hear the claim, in the sense that court would recognise and hear the 
plaintiff’s.  If the court addressed determines that, after its inquiry under the first limb, that a 
foreign forum is more closely connected with the dispute than the court addressed, then the 
second stage becomes relevant. At this point, the claimant can seek to resist a stay on the 
basis that a substantial injustice for the plaintiff would result if the claim was heard in the 
more closely connected forum.76 To persuade the court that a stay should be refused at the 
second stage, the claimant can adduce evidence which points to examples of an injustice 
being caused at virtually any stage in the court process in the most closely connected forum.77 
The sorts of factors that the court can consider at this stage include:78  
“…risk that justice will not be obtained by a foreign litigant in particular kinds of 
suits, whether for ideological or political reasons, inexperience or inefficiency of 
judiciary, … excessive delay in the conduct of the business of the courts or the 
unavailability of appropriate remedies…”79 
iii. Voth  
 
                                               
75 Spiliada Martime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd, above n 17, at 476. 
76 Ibid at 478.  
77 Ibid.  
78 The Abidin Daver [1984] 1 AC 398 (HL), at 411 per Lord Diplock. Although it will be apparent that the 
second limb of the test is focused on the plaintiff’s interests in having their claim heard in the forum addressed, 
the plaintiff is required to provide cogent evidence that these factors / allegations are true (Spiliada Martime 
Corporation v Cansulex Ltd, above n 17, at 478), and the defendant is entitled to dispute or rebut any such 
evidence of injustice. Importantly, the two-stage test under Spiliada highlights an approach of balancing both 
parties’ interests in the question of forum. Arzandeh notes that the focus of stage one of the test is a fact-finding 
analysis with the ultimate intention of preventing transnational commercial litigation in the forum addressed that 
has no connection to the forum  (see Ardavan Arzandeh “Should the Spiliada Test be Revised” (2014) 10 J Priv 
Int L 89, at 89-91). The corollary of this point is that the first element of the Spiliada test is clearly aimed at 
identifying at a situation where a dispute is obviously not connected with the forum addressed , and this clearly 
rebuts any inference that can be drawn from the second element, that the test is somehow weighted more heavily 
towards the plaintiffs interests. In fact the paradigm feature under Spiliada is a balanced approach recognising 
both parties interests in resolving the issue of forum.  
79 Other factors may also include a more favourable limitation period (although most jurisdictions now provide 
that the applicable limitation period is governed by the lex causae of the dispute rather than the lex fori, 
rendering this factor somewhat redundant e.g. see Limitation Act 2010 (NZ), s 55), the availability of greater 
damages (e.g. the ability to recover interest on an outstanding debt), or the existence of assets within the forum 
for the satisfaction of any resulting judgment. See R Garnett, above n 68, at 35.  
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In contrast, the leading Australian case, Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd, approaches the 
issue of forum by requiring the court to ask whether “it”80 is a “clearly inappropriate forum” 
for dealing with the dispute before a stay is granted.81 This directs the court not to stay or 
dismiss the proceedings simply because there is a clearly more appropriate court with 
jurisdiction in the proceedings, located in another country.82 A significant feature of the test 
under Voth is the role of the court in comparing “Australia” (as the forum addressed) and the 
defendant’s professed alternative forum. Under Voth the Court’s role is not to balance the 
interests of justice with reference to the alternative forum. By this, it is meant that the Court 
is not concerned with the advantages or disadvantages (for each party) that arise from the 
potential that the case could be heard in another forum.83 These advantages or disadvantages 
include those listed above at the second stage of the Spiliada test, as well as many other 
conceivable factors which could vary significantly from case to case.84 Rather than such an 
expansive enquiry, the focus of the Australian Court in Voth is on advantages or 
disadvantages that will arise from the continuation of proceedings within Australia.  
iv. Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth), s 19 
 
It is also worthwhile providing some further analysis of s 19 of the Australian legislation, 
which provides a further illustration of how the position under Voth is biased towards 
retaining proceedings commenced in Australia and therefore whether element three of the 
                                               
80 In its capacity as the Australian Court hearing the application for a stay.  
81 Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd, above n 17, at 558.  
82 Ibid.  
83 Ibid at 560-561.  
84 See Gray, above n 39, at 214-219.  However confusingly (and perhaps absurdly in light of the Australian 
Court’s rejection of the test in Spiliada) the factors listed as being relevant to element one and two of the test in 
the House of Lords decision are stated by the court as being be “equally valuable” in applying the “clearly 
inappropriate forum test” (see Voth, above n 17, at 564-565. Is not entirely clear what the difference is under the 
two tests (which obviously impacts on the extent Voth can be argued to be forum biased) – one tentative view is 
that because the role of the court in Voth is to focus on whether it, as the court addressed, is an inappropriate 
forum rather than undertaking a comparative exercise as to whether another court is “more appropriate”, the 
inquiry of the Spiliada factors is only relevant to the extent the indicate the Australian court is a clearly 
inappropriate forum. Therefore, to the extent personal and juridical advantages exist in a foreign forum, these 
are irrelevant if they do not bear on the issue of whether the Australian court is a “clearly inappropriate forum” 
to hear the dispute.  The better argument (as noted by Gray, Gray above n 39, at 226-228) is that the courts 
rejection of the balancing exercise in Spiliada (i.e. comparing the two forums in terms of which has the closer 
connection, as well as any potential juridical or personal advantages for the plaintiff in litigating in the chosen 
forum) is completely inconsistent with other statements in the judgment that these factors remain relevant under 
the clearly inappropriate forum test in Voth. This position has been expressly approved in later decisions of the 
Australian High Court (see Henry v Henry (1995) 185 CLR 571 at 592). In terms of the present issue of whether 
Australia’s private international law is biased, there is still compelling evidence that this is the case (see below, 
footnotes 92-96).  
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outer world problem is satisfied. This is also relevant to the discussion of how reform would 
be carried out to ameliorate the issue of the outer world problem. Section 19 provides the 
framework under which a court must consider any application for a stay under s 17 (including 
commercial contract cases where there is no exclusive choice of court clause), for 
proceedings served and commenced under the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth). 
The court may only grant a stay in favour of another court (in the present scenario, a New 
Zealand court), where the court has jurisdiction to determine the matter at issue between the 
parties, and it determines that this court is the “more appropriate forum”. Even where these 
first two elements are satisfied, the court still retains residual discretion to refuse a stay, 
although this discretion should only be exercised in exceptional circumstances.85 In 
considering whether the New Zealand court is the more appropriate court, the Australian 
court must have regard to the following factors:86  
a. the places of residence of the parties or, if a party is not an individual, its 
principal place of business;  
b. the places of residence of the witnesses likely to be called in the proceeding; 
c. the place where the subject matter of the proceeding is situated;  
d. any agreement between the parties about the court or place in which those 
matters should be determined or the proceeding should be commenced (other 
than an exclusive choice of court agreement to which subsection 20(1) 
applies);87  
e. the law that it would be most appropriate to apply in the proceeding;  
f. whether a related or similar proceeding has been commenced against the 
defendant or another person in a court in New Zealand;  
g. the financial circumstances of the parties, so far as the Australian court is 
aware of them;  
                                               
85 See Re Featherston Resources Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1139, at [51]. This residual discretion is based on the 
syntax of s 19, which states that the Australian court “may” order a stay if the elements in s 19(1)(a)-(b) are 
satisfied. Note the comments in Re Featherston however stressing the exceptional nature of this residual 
discretion to order a stay, and noting it was unlikely such a case would ever fall within this category (ibid). 
Therefore any residual discretion would be unlikely (based on obiter statements such as those in Re 
Featherston) to be used to refuse to order a stay even where the dispute had a satisfied the elements in s 
19(1)(a)-(b).  
86 Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth), s 19.  
87 Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth), s 20. Under s 20, an Australian court must order a stay (or 
conversely must refuse an application for a stay under s 17), if the parties have entered into an exclusive choice 
of court agreement that designates a New Zealand court (or an Australian court) as the courts to determine the 
matters at issue. However even if such a choice of court agreement falls outside of the statutory definition in s 
20(3), or is otherwise invalid under 20(2) (e.g. the clause is invalid under the laws of New Zealand), then s 19(2) 
mandates that it must still be taken into account by the court in considering whether to grant a stay under s 19.  
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h. any matter that is prescribed by the regulations;88 and  
i. any other matter that the Australian court considers relevant.  
The court is not permitted to take into account the fact that proceedings were commenced in 
Australia.89 In many respects, the test under s 19 is very similar to that provided for in 
Spiliada, albeit the basis of the test in s 19 is the cross-vesting scheme for trans-state disputes 
within Australia, rather than the common law test in Spiliada.90 This can be seen from the 
wording of s 19 (e.g. the reference to “more appropriate forum” as being the applicable test), 
the requirement the alternative forum have jurisdiction to hear the dispute, and the focus on a 
wide-ranging list of factors (many of which are similar or the same as those stated as being 
relevant to the question of a stay under Spiliada).91  
v. Comparison  
 
What then are the practical differences between the tests under Spiliada and s 19 of the 
Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010, and conversely Voth, with reference to the issue of 
forum allocation? The first significant difference is the position the court addressed takes 
with respect to the issue of whether Australia is the appropriate forum to hear the dispute. 
Under Spiliada, the court is tasked with carrying out an analysis of whether there is another 
“more appropriate” forum in which the dispute could be more justly heard, having regard to 
the interests of both parties. A similar approach is clearly mandated under s 19 of the 
                                               
88 There are none currently.  
89 Section 19(2).  
90 Trans-Tasman Working Group, Trans-Tasman Court Proceedings and Regulatory Enforcement: A Report by 
the Trans-Tasman Working Group (Ministry of Justice, December 2006) at 10, Service and Execution of 
Processes Act 1992 (Cth), s 20. The wording of section 20 of the Service and Execution of Processes Act 1992 
largely mirrors section 19, corroborating this point.  
91 As will be apparent from the factors under s 19, all of them would fall within the factors considered by the 
Court under the first element of the test for a stay in Spiliada, namely whether there is a forum more closely 
connected with the dispute than the one addressed. This would call into question to what extent the factors 
considered under the second element (i.e. whether there are any personal or juridical advantages to the plaintiff 
in allowing the court addressed to retain the proceedings) of the Spiliada test are relevant to the test under s 19, 
as these are not explicitly recognised under in the list of factors contained in s 19(2)(a)(-(h), and therefore 
calling into question whether the s 19 test and Spiliada are actually similar. However there is scope for the court 
consider any other matter that it considers relevant under s 19(2)(i), and jurisprudence which has developed post 
inception of the legislation indicates that courts will likely consider a wide range of factors (including those 
relevant to element two of the test for a stay under Spiliada) under this broad catch-all. For example, in Re 
Featherston, above n 85, at [53]-[54], it was noted that case law under the “more appropriate forum” test under s 
20 of the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (upon which the s 19 test in the Trans-Tasman Proceedings 
Act 2010 (Cth) is based) has pertinently held that factors under element two of Spiliada will be relevant with 
reference to the inquiry of what is the appropriate forum to hear the dispute under that section (see also James 
Hardie & Co Pty Ltd v Barry [2000] NSWCA 353 at [7]). In Re Featherston a similar approach with the more 
appropriate test in s 19 was expressly approved (at [53]-[54]).  
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Australian legislation as well. If such a forum exists (which is considered under the first 
element of the test), and it is in the interests of justices for the dispute to be heard there, then 
a stay is granted.  The current Australian approach under Voth, requires the court to only 
grant a stay where it considers that it is a clearly inappropriate forum to deal with the dispute. 
Other than the actual semantics of the test in Voth,92 conceptual differences between the two 
tests can be seen by comparing the circumstances in which a stay can be granted, and which 
highlight the forum biased approach of the current state of the law in Australia.  
Under all three tests, the existence of an appropriate alternative forum to hear the dispute will 
usually be present.93 Where they differ is the significance this is given. Under Spiliada and s 
19, the role of the court is to consider whether there is a more appropriate forum to hear the 
dispute before a stay is granted. In contrast the test in Voth requires the court to ask whether 
“it” as the court addressed is a clearly inappropriate forum before a stay is granted. The mere 
fact that the court of another country would be a more appropriate forum for the particular 
proceeding to be heard in does not necessarily mean that the local court is a clearly 
inappropriate one.94  
With reference to stay applications, this means that in some cases (where there was a strong 
argument that dispute is more closely connected with another forum), Australian courts have 
refused to grant a stay because they have ruled that, despite this strong connection, the 
Australian court was not a clearly inappropriate forum to hear the dispute.95 It is likely that if 
                                               
92 Which are patently biased towards retaining the proceedings – i.e. the test in Voth starts from the presumption 
that Australia is an appropriate forum to hear the dispute at it must be shown that is a clearly inappropriate 
forum before a stay will be granted. When applying such a test the court is therefore starting from the position 
that a stay should not be granted – see R Garnett, above n 68, at 35. The corollary is that the test is biased 
towards retaining proceedings because it is assumed the plaintiff’s choice in commencing proceedings was the 
correct one, unless this is shown otherwise (logically by the defendant, although the formal evidential onus lies 
on the plaintiff, see footnote 74).  
93 It should be noted that the test in Spiliada and s 19 requires the existence of another more appropriate forum / 
court, before a stay can be granted. In contrast, the test under Voth (because it focuses on whether the court 
addressed is a “clearly inappropriate” one to hear the dispute, there is the potential the court could in fact rule 
itself a “clearly inappropriate forum” despite the absence of an alternative forum for the plaintiff to recommence 
proceedings, see Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd, above n 17, at 558). Taking a practical example, such a 
situation could arise where an action was time barred in a foreign jurisdiction but has no connection with the 
Australian forum.  This facet of the test in Voth would potentially suggest that the test is in-fact biased towards 
the defendant’s interest in forum, as there is the possibility under Voth that the Australian court would order a 
stay in circumstances which would deny the plaintiff any remedy. Under the Spiliada / s 19 tests this is not 
possible, as the court must be satisfied (before ordering a stay), that the “more appropriate forum” would have 
jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff’s claim before ordering a stay. However, some Australian judges have suggested 
that such an outcome could “…only be contemplated in an extreme case” (see Henry v Henry, above n 82, at 
578). This would again refute any argument this aspect of the test in Voth is in fact not “forum biased”.    
94 Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc v Fay, above n 17, at 243 
95 See for example Al-Ru Farm Pty Ltd v Hedleys Humpers Ltd SASC, 10 January 1991, Phosphate Co-
operative Company of Australia Ltd v SGS Supervision Services Inc SC 7 April 1993.  
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these cases had been governed by Spiliada (or s 19) a stay would have been ordered, as all 
the factors relating to the defendant’s liability arose in a foreign forum and there appeared to 
be little or no juridical advantage (e.g. Australian law allowed for the greater recovery of 
damages) for the plaintiff suing in Australia. The corollary is that under the current state of 
Australia’s private international law with respect to forum non conveniens cases, little 
deference is given to the potential that an alternative forum would be more appropriate to 
hear the dispute, and in practice this has resulted in a significant number of these types of 
cases being retained by Australian courts.96 Compared to the common arrangements under 
the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth), s 19, the test for a stay under Voth in forum 
non conveniens cases is clearly biased and demonstrates element three of the outer world 
problem is present.  
(c) Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements 
 
i. Introduction  
 
The next category of cases which might arise with reference to the outer world problem is 
where there is an exclusive choice of court clause contained within the commercial contract 
at issue. Exclusive choice of court clauses should be further distinguished from non-exclusive 
choice of court clauses, as again the applicable test for resolving the issue of forum differs.97  
An exclusive choice of court clause requires that the parties intended to confer jurisdiction on 
a particular court with respect to the dispute, but also to preclude any other court from 
exercising jurisdiction with respect to the dispute.98 A non-exclusive choice of court clause, 
by contrast, does not prevent a party from suing in an alternative forum.99 However despite 
                                               
96 James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd v Cameron [1995] NSWDDT 5,  
James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd v Bruce [1996] NSWDDT 6, Putt v James Hardie & Co Pty 
Ltd [1998] NSWDDT 1,  James Hardie Industries Pty Ltd v Grigor (1998) 45 NSWLR 20,  
Union Shipping New Zealand Ltd v Morgan [2002] NSWCA 124, James Hardie and Co  
Limited v Coyle [1998] NSWSC 190, Band B (Re Jurisdiction) [2003] FamCA 
105.  
97 See R Garnett, above n 68, at 61-63.  
98 Ibid at 61.  
99 Ibid. The reason (other than the parties avoiding limiting their ability to commence proceedings in more than 
one forum) for including a non-exclusive choice of court agreement in a contract is to allow either party to sue 
on the contract in the forum to which submission is made to the jurisdiction, without being required to seek 
leave of the court addressed to serve proceedings on a defendant located outside of the jurisdiction or 
alternatively, any money judgment obtained by the defendant (even obtained in default of their appearance), is 
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these different tests, the current state of Australian private international law remains biased 
towards retaining proceedings.  
ii. Akai  
 
In terms of cases where there is an exclusive choice of court agreement,100  the leading re-
statement of the applicable principles is the Australian High Court decision of Akai, which 
provides that unless there are strong reasons not to enforce the choice of court agreement, 
proceedings brought in breach of that agreement should normally be stayed, assuming the 
case is one in which a party has sought to challenge the clause (and vice-versa).101 As Garnett 
notes, this approach supersedes the “clearly inappropriate forum” test for a stay in Voth, and 
where the parties have agreed to an exclusive jurisdiction clause, the parties must show 
“strong reasons” or “exceptional circumstances” before a stay will be granted.102 In these 
circumstances “strong reasons” (or exceptional circumstances) has escaped a fixed judicial 
assessment, which has resulted in a significant amount of leeway being conferred on 
Australian courts as to when not to enforce such agreements.103 For example the Australian 
High Court has held in other cases that the court’s discretion in this respect “…has not been 
restricted by any exclusive definition of the circumstances which will warrant refusal of a 
stay.”104 One of the more limited statements has set out a long list of factors which may guide 
the court’s discretion but even then it has been emphasised that such a list is not 
exhaustive.105 The onus is on the party disputing the choice of court agreement.106  
                                                                                                                                                  
likely to be enforceable in most other countries, and in particular other common law countries where the 
defendant has already submitted to the jurisdiction of the court (see Goddard and McLachlan , above n 25, at 
51).  
100 Mortensen, above n 2, at 80, Akai Pty Ltd v People's Insurance Co Ltd, above n 25, 418.  
101 Ibid at 445, 447.  
102 The difference in wording appears to be semantics, and arises because of the language used by English courts 
when considering whether to grant a stay where proceedings are brought in breach of a an exclusive choice of 
court agreement. Case law from England has been expressly approved by Australian courts considering a stay in 
this scenario, and therefore case law on what amounts to “exceptional circumstances” is relevant to the 
Australian test  (see R Garnett, “The Enforcement of Jurisdiction Clauses” (1998) 21 UNSWLJ 1, at 9-10).  
103 A Bell “Jurisdiction and Arbitration Agreements in Transnational Contracts” (1996) 10 Jnl Contract L 53, at 
61.  
104 Huddart Parker v The Ship the Mill Hill (1950) 81 CLR 502 at 509.  
105 See the below quote from the decision in The Eleftheria [1970]  p 94 at  100:  
 
“In exercising its discretion, the court should take into account all the circumstances of the particular case.  In  
particular  ... the following  matters,  where they  arise,  may properly  be  regarded:  (a)  In  what  country  the  
evidence  on  the  issues  of  fact  is situated,  or more readily available,  and  the  effect of that on the relative  
convenience and  expense  of trial  as  between  the English  and the  foreign  courts.  (b) Whether the law of the 
foreign court applies and if so, whether it differs from English law in any material respects. (c) With what 
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iii. Bias Under Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements   
 
On face value, there does not appear to be anything inherently  
biased about courts retaining a residual distraction to refuse a stay even where there is an 
exclusive choice of court agreement.107 However the manner in which this discretion has 
been exercised by Australian courts manifests a biased approach towards protecting the 
interests of local residents from being sued or forced to sue overseas.108 As noted earlier, this 
appears to have arisen largely from the wide discretion conferred on Australian courts when 
considering whether to refuse a stay. This extensive discretion retained by Australian courts 
has given them the ability to supposedly pay lip service to the importance of upholding an 
exclusive choice of court agreement, yet in practice refuse to order a stay in a wide-ranging 
set of circumstances.  
For example, in Lewis Construction v Tichauer, an exclusive choice of court agreement was 
not enforced on the basis that the balance of convenience lay with requiring the dispute to be 
heard in Australia.109  There, the Supreme Court  of Victoria had to  consider  an  action  by a 
Victorian  company  against  a French  company for breach  of contract  in  relation to the 
supply of a  defective  crane.  The crane had been  built  in  France and  then  shipped  to  
Melbourne  where,  after being  installed,  it  fell,  causing injuries to  persons  and property.  
The defendant applied for a stay of proceedings on the basis of the existence of an exclusive 
jurisdiction clause in the parties’ contract.  The parties had also made a choice of French law.  
                                                                                                                                                  
country either party is connected, and how closely. (d)  Whether  the defendants  genuinely desire  trial  in the 
foreign  country,  or  are  only seeking  procedural  advantages.  (e) Whether  the  plaintiffs  would  be  
prejudiced  by having to  sue  in  the  foreign  forum  because  they  would:  (i) be  deprived  of security for their 
claim (ii) be  unable  to  enforce  any judgment obtained  (iii)  be  faced with  time  bar  not  applicable  in  
England  or  (iv)  for  political,  racial,  religious  or  other reasons  be unlikely  to get a fair trial.”  
106 Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board Ship or Vessel Eleftheria v The Eleftheria (Owners) [1969] 2 WLR 
1073.  
107 As Garnett notes, the rationale for this would appear to be that that parties could not oust the jurisdiction of 
the court merely by agreeing this to be the case, R Garnett, above n 102, at 9.  
108 Ibid at 10. Cases can generally can be broken down into two categories: i) where the parties have elected a 
foreign jurisdiction (other than Australia) as the exclusive court to resolve their dispute and a stay is sought by 
the foreign party in their capacity as a defendant being sued in Australia and ii) the same scenario but where the 
party seeking the stay is a local Australian defendant (e.g. potentially in cases of lis pendens, where the 
Australian defendant has commenced proceedings in Australia based on say a counterclaim or set-off under the 
contract).  For present purposes (the focus of the third element being on the foreign defendant, the party 
disadvantaged under outer world problem) the first category of cases will be used to illustrate the presence of 
element three of the outer world problem.  
109 Lewis Construction v Tichauer [1966] VR 341 (VSC).  
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However, the court  refused  to  grant  a stay  because, it was alleged the majority  of 
evidence which  would be relevant  to the case was located  in Victoria rather  than France,  
and  so  trial  would  be much  more  convenient  in Australia.  The plaintiff  would  be  
subjected  to  a  "positive  injustice"  if  forced  to  litigate in France. 
It is argued this decision gives insufficient primacy to the jurisdiction clause. This is 
particularly since it was exclusive, and highlights the earlier point, namely, that Australian 
courts have, at times, unduly sought to protect their residents from having to litigate overseas. 
The fact that  important  evidence  was located  in  France  and  that  the  defendant  would  
be  deprived  of  a  significant juridical  advantage  in  not  being  able  to  join  its  supplier  
in  the  Victorian proceedings  should  have  also  been  taken into account, and ultimately, 
decisive of the question of forum.  The  high probability  that  the court  would  be required to 
apply  French  law  to  resolve  the  dispute should  also have been  given  greater 
significance.  French law,  being foreign,  would  have had to  be proven  by  expert  evidence  
before  the  court,  to the significant cost of the parties and with the potential for error on the 
courts part.  
As the reasoning in this case would demonstrate, the loosely prescribed discretion of 
Australian courts allows them significant freedom to ultimately rule that the exclusive choice 
of court clause is unenforceable and a stay should not be granted. This results in attempts by 
courts (as illustrated by the reasoning in Lewis), in overplaying factors which favour refusing 
to enforce the choice of court agreement, in order to justify the refusal of stay. Neither is the 
decision in Lewis an anomaly, in a number of similar cases stays have been refused based on 
the wide distraction with respect to enforcement and the paternalistic approach taken by 
Australian courts with reference to local Australian residents.110  
Although Lewis was decided over two decades ago, subsequent-case-law again demonstrates 
the propensity of Australian courts to retain proceedings brought in breach of a choice of 
court agreements.111 For example by 2008, there was only an 11 per cent chance that an 
                                               
110See for example Lep International v Atlanttrafic Express Service (1987) 10 NSWLR 614 (NSWSC), Gem 
Plastics v Satrex Maritime SC, 9 June 1995, Hopkins v Difrex Societe Anonyme [1966] 1 NSWR 979 (NSWSC).  
111 In the event the choice of court agreement dictates that Australia is the chosen forum, Australian courts are 
hardly likely to refuse to retain the proceedings based on the current state of its private international law, which 
would appear to be discriminatory to the foreign defendant when this is commonplace with respect to exclusive 
choice of court agreements which dictate a foreign forum as the designated court, see RA Brand and SR 
Jablonski, Forum Non Conveniens: History, Global Practice, and Future Under the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements (Oxford University Press, 2007) at 100. Conversely in cases where the plaintiff is 
in breach of a choice of court of agreement, the high threshold for refusing stay only goes to further demonstrate 
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Australian court would uphold a choice of court agreement that exclusively designated a 
foreign court for the litigation.112 
vi. Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth), s 20 
 
A useful comparison point to the Australian approach to exclusive choice of court agreements 
is their position under the TTPA. Under s 20 (as noted earlier), it is mandatory for the 
Australian court to order a stay (or refuse to order a stay), where the court is satisfied that an 
“exclusive choice of court agreement” designates New Zealand (or Australia) as the court to 
determine the matters in issue.113 It should be noted that a stay is mandatory, unless the 
provisos in s 20 are satisfied.114 An exclusive choice of court agreement must:115  
a) designate the courts, or a specified court or courts, of a specified country, to the 
exclusion of any other courts, as the court or courts to determine disputes between 
those parties that are or include those matters; and  
b) is not an agreement the parties to which are or include an individual acting primarily 
for personal, family, or household purposes; and  
c) is not a contract of employment.  
Section 20 is largely based off the provisions of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements, albeit that it only applies in the context of the TTPA.116 As Mortensen notes, the 
                                                                                                                                                  
the lengths Australian courts will go to retain proceedings – see M Keyes “Jurisdiction under the Hague Choice 
of Courts Convention: Its Likely Impact on Australian Practice” (2009) 5 J Priv Int L 181 at 199-200.  
112M Keyes, above n 111.  
113 Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth), s 20.  
114 Section 20(2)-(2A).  In cases where a New Zealand court is designated the court of choice, the Australian 
court may refuse to order a stay despite the existence of an exclusive choice agreement in the following 
circumstances:  
 
a) it is null and void under New Zealand law (including the rules of private international law); or  
b) a party to it lacked the capacity to conclude it under Australian law; or  
c) giving effect to it would lead to a manifest injustice or would be manifestly contrary to Australian 
public policy; or 
d) for exceptional reasons beyond the control of the parties to it, it cannot reasonably be performed; or  
e) the court designated by it as the court to determine the matters in issue between the parties to the 
proceeding has decided not to determine those matters.  
 
In cases where an Australian court is designated the court of choice, the Australian court may refuse to order a 
stay on the basis of the existence of an exclusive choice agreement where the Australian court is satisfied that 
the agreement is null and void under Australian law (including the rules of private international law). 
115 Section 20(3).  
116 Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005 (done at The Hague 30 June 2005).  See also Trans-
Tasman Working Group, Trans-Tasman Court Proceedings and Regulatory Enforcement: A Report by the 
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Hague Convention is premised on two key principles, namely that when litigants are party to 
a choice of court agreement, they are generally (subject to very limited exceptions) required 
to litigate their dispute in the elected forum.117 Conversely, where the parties have brought 
proceedings in a member forum of the Convention, in breach of such an agreement, the court 
of that forum is generally required to stay the proceedings in favour of the court located in the 
member state the parties elected. The theme is self-evidently one of commitment to 
contractual commitments, and with a stronger expectation than the common law (as can be 
seen above) about the expectation that agreements about where to litigate are adhered to.  
At a practical level this can be seen by comparing the exceptions at common law to the 
enforcement of an exclusive jurisdiction clause, as compared to those under the TTPA. The 
grounds under which an Australian court can refuse to grant a stay where the court is satisfied 
there is an exclusive choice of court agreement within the meaning of the legislation are 
heavily circumscribed.118 So for example, the court may refuse a stay on the basis that the 
agreement is null and void under the laws of New Zealand, which for example would include 
examples such as the contract itself was invalid,119 or was contrary to a statute. Lack of 
contractual capacity is also a stated ground. “Manifest injustice” (undefined) was not 
included in the Hague Convention,120 as an exception to enforcement of an agreement. This 
would appear to confer some residual discretion on the Australian court to refuse a stay, but 
the strong language used in the section is likely to mean that this discretion will rarely (if 
ever) be exercised in favour of issuing a stay.121 Similar reasoning is likely applicable to the 
“exceptional circumstances” beyond the parties control proviso (and again the reason the 
                                                                                                                                                  
Trans-Tasman Working Group (Ministry of Justice, December 2006) at 16. The Choice of Court convention 
was drafted at the Hague Convention of Private International Law (of which both New Zealand and Australia 
are members), however has not yet been ratified by either country.  There are a number of key differences 
however, for example a number of exceptions to enforcement of an exclusive choice of court clause have been 
omitted from the TTPA, additionally different wording to the Convention article has been used, see Ronald A 
Brand and Paul M Herrup The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (Cambridge University 
Press, 2008) at 98-138. For present purposes this is largely irrelevant – it is argued that even the diluted form of 
s 20 (based on the Convention) is less biased than the current approach taken under Australian private 
international law.  
117 Moretensen, above n 2, at 80.  
118 Additionally the court must be satisfied that the dispute falls within the scope of the choice of court clause 
(see Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010, s 20(1)(a)-(b)) – for example the clause may have been drafted 
narrowly to apply to only certain claims, or conversely, broadly drafted to embrace all claims arising from the 
contract.  
119 E.g. the absence of consideration, lack of intention to create a legal relationship, the contract was an illegal 
one (see the Illegal Contract Act 1970, s 7).  Similar reasoning is likely to be applicable to the “null and void” 
exception vis a choice of court agreement which elects Australia as the designated court (see s 20(2A).  
120 Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005 (done at The Hague 30 June 2005), art 9(a)-(g).  
121 And is likely to be much more circumscribed than Australian court’s current discretion with respect to the 
enforcement of choice of court agreement, although it is impossible to conclusively prove this until further 
jurisprudence has developed in the interpretation and application of s 20.  
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agreement should not be enforced would need to be beyond the parties control). The 
manifestly contrary to Australian public policy ground is likely to be interpreted according to 
how the phrase is used in other Hague Conventions, requiring a clear and serious breach of 
public policy before the agreement will be rendered unenforceable under s 20.122 The 
application of the final exception to enforcement of an agreement (that the designated court 
has refused to determine the matters at issue between the parties) is likely to cover situations 
where the designated court lacks jurisdiction, and therefore has resolved not to hear the 
matter.123   
Compared to the wide ranging discretion present under Akai to refuse a stay, the grounds 
contained within s 20(2)-(2A) are relatively circumscribed when it comes to refusing to 
enforce an exclusive choice of court agreement to which the Australian legislation applies. 
For example, under s 20, the Australian court would be unable to refuse to enforce an 
exclusive choice of court designating a New Zealand court as the chosen forum, merely 
because it thinks that more of the evidence is located in Australia (to use the Lewis fact 
scenario).124 More importantly, the circumstances in which an exclusive choice of court 
agreement is unenforceable under s 20 are generally not aimed at allowing the court a 
“custodial” role in protecting the interests of one particular party over the other. This is a 
direct result of the circumscribed nature of the exceptions, namely an exhaustive list of 
grounds upon which enforcement might be refused. The result is that the potential for bias in 
the case of exclusive choice of court under the TTPA is heavily mitigated, and in general an 
Australian court will be required to enforce it and order a stay.   
v. Outer World Problem and Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements 
 
In terms of element three of the outer world problem, two arguments may be made as to why 
the Australia’s private international law is biased with respect to exclusive choice of court 
                                               
122 See Brand and Herrup, above n 116, at 92-93, 117. Both Australian and New Zealand courts have generally 
been hesitant to utilise public policy exceptions to enforcement of legal rights – for example in the context of 
enforcing a foreign judgment see Marine Services Ltd v Bolton (1992) 6 PRNZ 173 (HC).  
123 For example, if the parties elected that the District Court of New Zealand was to have exclusive jurisdiction 
to hear the claim, but the claim was in excess of $200,000. See District Court Act 1947, s 29.  
124 An argument would have to be made that this fits within the s 20(2)(c) (i.e. the manifest injustice exception) 
– again s 20 (despite seemingly maintaining some residual discretion to refuse to enforce an exclusive choice of 
court clause), sets the bar much harder than the strong reasons / exceptional circumstances test in Akai, meaning 
it will be much rarer for courts under the TTPA to be able to justify refusing to enforce an exclusive choice of 
court agreement on the ground that it results in hardship for one of the parties. Under the current state of 
Australian law, this is the norm rather than the exception.  
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clauses. Firstly, in cases where the parties have elected that a foreign court should have 
exclusive jurisdiction to resolve their dispute, the current state of Australia’s private 
international law means that it is highly likely that in the event a foreign defendant is sued in 
Australia (in breach of such an agreement), the court (under established case law) has wide 
discretion to refuse to grant a stay with reference to the strong reasons / exceptional 
circumstances proviso for refusing to enforce such a clause. In this scenario, despite earlier 
issues noted as to the presence of outer world problem in the case of international commercial 
contract disputes, it is clear that Australia’s private international law takes an overly biased 
approach to exclusive jurisdiction clauses. Compared to the TTPA (where generally the 
parties choice of court is upheld subject to very few exceptions), Australia’s private 
international law is biased towards retaining proceedings, even in the case of commercial 
contracts.  
The second argument which can be made is that, even in cases where the foreign defendant 
has elected an Australian Court is the more appropriate forum; a degree of bias still arises. 
This is because, in contrast to the Australian local resident of the common market, an 
Australian court is much less likely to be willing to refuse to order a stay where the parties 
have elected Australia as the appropriate forum.  
The focus of the earlier discussion was around the fact that bias arises generally because of 
Australian court’s willingness to protect the interests of local residents over foreign 
defendants, as well as the wide discretion as to when a stay might be refused. This discussion 
was with reference to where the parties have elected that a foreign court as the court to 
resolve their dispute – but what of when they have chosen Australia in their exclusive choice 
of court agreement? On the one hand it might be argued that this counterbalances the bias 
alleged earlier, namely that even though Australian courts are generally unwilling to uphold 
an exclusive choice of court agreement with reference to foreign courts, a similar approach is 
taken to clauses which elect Australia as the court of choice.  
Additionally it might be argued that (as noted earlier), the foreign defendant cannot be heard 
to complain of the private international law of the state addressed being biased, where it is 
merely giving effect to the ability of the parties to pre-regulate where disputes under the 
contract arise.  However, this ignores the reality that the current state of Australian private 
international law, as a local resident of Australia has a strong possibility of arguing that (in 
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the very same scenario),125 a stay should not be granted. There would appear to be a degree of 
unfairness in failing to consider whether foreign defendants can avail themselves of a similar 
juridical advantage.  
The same legal test applies whether or not the forum elected in the choice of court agreement 
is Australia, or not. However the key difference is the approach Australian courts takes to the 
issue of a stay where Australia is the chosen court. Effectively the issue in this latter scenario 
is an institutional level bias towards retaining proceedings in Australia, seemingly based on a 
desire to protect local residents from being sued or having to sue abroad.126 Obviously it is 
difficult to prove this directly, but circumstantial evidence would indicate this is a fair 
assessment of the current state of Australia’s private international law. Australian courts have 
a strong tendency to retain proceedings commenced within the jurisdiction, despite the fact 
that the dispute will often have a strong connection with another forum.127 The rationale for 
taking this approach can be seen by comparing it to cases where a foreign plaintiff has 
commenced proceedings in Australia against a local defendant. The approach of the 
Australian court in these cases (albeit the absence of an exclusive choice of court 
agreement),128 has generally been refuse to order a stay.129 The primary reason given by the 
courts has generally been that the local Australian defendant cannot seriously complain that 
proceedings commenced against them in their home jurisdiction should be stayed. It is 
difficult to conceive of what (if any) disadvantage or unfairness arises for the plaintiff in 
these circumstances. The unwillingness of Australian courts to grant stays in such cases 
would demonstrate that the impetus for the current bias under Australian private international 
law is attributable to the desire the courts have in protecting local residents from the costs, 
inconvenience, and (potential) juridical disadvantages from being forced to litigate overseas.  
Accepting that this is the underlying rationale for Australian court’s refusal to grant a stay in 
cases where there is a foreign exclusive choice of court agreement, it is unsurprising that 
                                               
125 Where the Australian resident party seeks to challenge the enforcement of an exclusive jurisdiction clause, 
the difference being that a foreign court has been selected in the exclusive choice of court agreement and a local 
plaintiff commences proceedings in Australia (in breach of such a clause) as compared to the scenario under 
discussion i.e. the parties have selected an Australian court in there exclusive choice of court agreement and the 
foreign defendant now seeks to challenge the enforcement of this clause.  
126 R Garnett, above n 102, at 10.  
127 See footnotes 62-134.  
128 For present purposes this is irrelevant, the more relevant aspect of these cases is that they highlight 
Australian courts are often concerned with protecting local residents (which can still be seen despite the absence 
of an exclusive choice of court agreement in these cases).  
129 See R Garnett, above n 68, at 40, Banque Paribas v Jarrett SC, 25 July 1991, Prebble v Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation SC, 6 September 1996, James Hardie Industries Pty Ltd v Grigor, above n 96.  
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there is not a single reported case where an Australian court has refused to enforce an 
exclusive choice of court clause which elected an Australian court as the forum of choice.130 
Clearly this is because Australian courts are more concerned with protecting local resident’s 
interests as opposed to those of foreign defendants. However it is also self-evidently biased – 
and discriminatory.  
In conclusion, it can be seen that despite the possibility for parties to pre-determine where 
any dispute is heard under their commercial contract, the large discretion conferred on 
Australian court to refuse to enforce an exclusive choice of court clause, and the inconsistent 
application of this discretion in the cases of foreign defendants illustrates the biased nature of 
the current state of Australia’s private international law with reference to exclusive choice of 
court agreements. Compared to the arrangements under the TTPA (where primacy is given to 
enforcement of the exclusive choice of court agreement), it is clear element three of the outer 
world problem is present.  
(b) Non-exclusive Choice of Court Agreements  
 
The final type of fact scenario which may arise in the case of international commercial 
contracts is non-exclusive choice of court agreements. As noted earlier, such a clause does 
not exclusively bind the parties to litigate their dispute in one forum, however under 
established Australian case law, will be a relevant factor taken into account by the court when 
considering an application for a stay under Voth.131 However, under the current state of 
Australia’s private international law, it will generally be a very rare case where a foreign 
defendant, who has agreed to a non-exclusive choice of court agreement (which confers 
jurisdiction on a local Australian court), is then able to obtain a stay of the local proceedings 
in favour of another forum.132 Again this appears to be systemic of the institutional level bias 
                                               
130 R Garnett, above n 102.  
131 Ibid at 2-3.  
132 For example, in  Woolworths v D S McMillan SC, 29 February 1988, a New South Wales court refused a 
defendant's application for a stay in favour England, where both parties had agreed to "submit to jurisdiction of 
any competent court in the Commonwealth of Australia" and resolve any dispute "in accordance with the law 
and practice applicable in such court". The clause was interpreted to be a non-exclusive choice of court 
agreement and did not vest the local Australian courts with exclusive jurisdiction over any disputes that may 
have arisen between the parties. However the court argued it should be enforced since it was part of a freely 
negotiated commercial bargain. The court would therefore be frustrating the parties' intentions by not giving 
effect to the clause. This of course ignores the key point that it was not the intention of the parties that the 
Australian courts would have exclusive jurisdiction to resolve all disputes. The overplaying of this factor by the 
Supreme Court in Woolworths is a similar example of the approach taken by Australian courts with respect to 
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present in the Australian court system. Under the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010, a 
non-exclusive choice of court agreement falls outside of the scope of the mandatory stay 
provision contained within s 20.133 Under s 19(2)(d) it is a factor the court is required to take 
into account when considering whether to grant a stay under s 17 / 19, on the basis that New 
Zealand is the more appropriate forum.  
Under both the TTPA, and Australia’s private international law, the existence of a non-
exclusive choice of court agreement is a factor considered by the Court when considering the 
granting of a stay. However, based on the Supreme Court decision in Woolworths, 
commercial contractual disputes subject to Australian private international law (where a non-
exclusive choice of court agreement submitting to the jurisdiction of an Australian court is 
present) will rarely (if ever) have a stay granted.134 Australian courts are much more likely to 
be willing to over-emphasise the use of such a clause as a factor justifying the refusal of a 
stay, when there may be other compelling factors pointing to the opposite outcome. However, 
when compared to the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth), it is difficult to see how 
this particular issue is addressed. The “more appropriate court” test for a stay contained 
within s 19 does not provide any guidance on the balancing of factors (such as the existence 
of a non-exclusive choice of court agreement), against factors which point against a stay. 
Therefore an identical issue could foreseeably arise under the TTPA. This is especially so as 
it will be the same system of courts (Australian), albeit applying the test for a stay under s 19 
rather than that provided for in Voth. Consequently element three of the outer world problem 
is not present in the case of non-exclusive choice of court agreements, as the TTPA does not 
appear to address the issue which has arisen under Australia’s private international law (the 
willingness to use such an agreement as an overriding factor to refuse a stay).  
4 Streamlined  Reciprocal Enforcement Regime 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
exclusive choice of court agreements (i.e. overplaying particular factors in order to justify refusing to enforce 
such agreements). Invariably this will be to the foreign defendant’s disadvantage, as the plaintiff will have 
served proceedings on the defendant (without leave of the court being required), in reliance of such a clause in 
Australia, and by agreeing to such a clause, the foreign defendant has likely invariably set themselves up to be 
required to defend proceedings in Australia, when the original intent of the agreement was to merely create this 
as a possibility.  
133 Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth), ss 19(2)(d), 20(3). 
134 Even more rarely than under the “clearly inappropriate” test under Voth.  
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(a) Overview  
 
The final-feature-of the-outer-world-problem-is that the outer world judgment obtained under 
the private international law of the forum addressed within the common market becomes 
automatically enforceable within the common market.135 Moving to the New Zealand 
legislation an Australian civil judgment will become enforceable throughout the other 
Australian states,136 and New Zealand, subject to limited grounds of challenge.137 The-TTPA-
provides-for-the enforcement of registrable Australian judgments, including a final and-
conclusive judgment138 that is given in civil proceedings by an Australian Court.139 A civil 
proceeding is a proceeding which is not a criminal proceeding.140 The definition obviously 
covers a judgment arising from a dispute under a commercial contract. A further caveat is 
that the registerable Australian judgment cannot relate to an excluded matter. These excluded 
matters do not relate to enforceability of a judgment relating to a contractual dispute.141 
Assuming the judgment falls within the definition in section 54; the entitled party is required 
to apply to the registrar of the relevant court in the prescribed form in order to register the 
judgment within six years of the date of judgment.142  
Once the registrar accepts registration of the Australian civil judgment, the entitled party is 
required to give notice in the prescribed form of registration to the liable party within 15 days 
from the date of registration, or a longer period on application to the relevant Court.143 On 
completion of registration and notice to all liable parties the judgment is deemed to be 
                                               
135 Mortensen, above n 2, at 90-91.  
136 See Mortensen, above n 2, at 63, for the process of inter-state enforcement of judgments in Australia. Any 
issues which arise from the cross-border enforcement of an Australian civil judgment under its cross-vesting 
scheme isn’t affected by the TTPA (the focus of this paper), but is worth remembering because the outer world 
judgment can also be enforced not only throughout New Zealand under the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 
(NZ) but in all the other states in Australia under the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) to the 
further prejudice of the foreign defendant.  
137 Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (NZ), s 61, 68. See Goddard and McLachlan , above n 25, at 84-85.  
138 That phrase is undefined in the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (NZ) (see s 4). It is likely that case law 
developed under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1934 (NZ), ss 3(4) and 3A(5) (the previously 
applicable enforcement regime vis Australian civil judgements) would be applicable to the phrase as used under 
the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (NZ), s 54(1)(a). A judgment may be final and conclusive even where 
obtained in default of the defendant’s appearance (Barclays Bank Ltd v Piacun [1984] 2 Qd R 476) or where 
subject to an appeal or an appeal is pending (Hunt v BP Exploration Company (Libya) Ltd [1980] 1 NZLR 104 
(HC)). 
139 Sections 54(1)(a), 57.  
140 Section 4, definition of “civil proceeding”.  
141 Section 4, definition of “excluded matter”.  
142 Section 56, Trans-Tasman Proceedings Regulations and Rules 2013, regs 14-20.   
143 Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (NZ), s 62, Trans-Tasman Proceedings Regulations and Rules 2013, 
reg 19.  
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enforceable as if were a judgment of a New Zealand Court.144 The entitled party can then take 
enforcement steps under the applicable Court rules depending on the nature of the judgment, 
and the appropriate Court to commence enforcement proceedings.145 
The definition of an Australian registrable judgment draws no distinction between whether 
the Australian civil judgment is one obtained in accordance with Australia’s private 
international law or the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) (and the test under s 
19).146 The definition focuses on the nature of the judgment and whether it is “final and 
conclusive”, rather than the relevant scheme which resolved the issue of the most appropriate 
forum to hear the dispute.  
(b) Automatic Enforcement  
 
Use of the phrase “automatic enforcement” is potentially a misnomer, as the process above 
demonstrates, there are a number of administrative steps that must be taken before the 
Australian judgment can be enforced in New Zealand. Another key point to analyse is how 
enforcement of a registered judgment can be challenged. This is where efficiency of the 
enforcement regime arises, and correspondingly, where the unfairness of the outer world 
problem arguably arises under the TTPA.   
Under section 61 of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (NZ), the defendant may apply 
to set aside registration (and therefore the ability to enforce the), within 30 working days of 
receiving notice under s 57 (or a longer period if the leave of the New Zealand court is 
sought).147 The exclusive grounds upon which the defendant may challenge the registration of 
the judgment are as follows:148  
                                               
144 Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (NZ), s 63.  
145 See Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (NZ), s 64,   High Court Rules 2009, Part 17 (Enforcement), 
District Court Rules 2014, Part 19 (Enforcement), Judicature Act 1908, s 16, District Court Act 1947, s 29.  
146 Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (NZ), s 54. This will generally depend on the monetary sum sought 
under the judgment – the District Court has jurisdiction to enforce claims of up to $200,000, whereas the High 
Court enforcement jurisdiction is uncapped in terms of the sum payable under the judgment.  
147 Ibid, s 61. Additionally it should be noted that the defendant may seek a stay of enforcement of the registered 
judgment within a 15 day period once notified of registration, on the basis that they will be challenging the 
judgment in the original Australian court (see s 65).  
148 Section 61(1) provides that “This section specifies the only situations in which a New Zealand court in which 
an Australian judgment has been registered under section 57 may set aside the registration of the judgment.”  
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a) the judgment was registered in contravention of this Act;149 or 
b) enforcement of the judgment would be contrary to public policy in New Zealand; or 
c) both of the following subparagraphs apply:150 
i. the judgment was given in a proceeding the subject matter of which was 
immovable property, or was given in a proceeding in rem the subject matter of 
which was movable property; and 
ii. that property was, at the time of the proceeding in the original court or 
tribunal, not situated in Australia. 
The key basis to challenging the registration is therefore that the enforcement of the judgment 
would be contrary to public policy. In this context historical case law which developed under 
section 6 of the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgment Act 1934 (NZ) (which originally 
governed the question of enforcement of foreign judgments), is likely to continue to guide 
New Zealand courts in the context of s 61(2)(b).151 Under New Zealand case law, it has been 
highlighted that the public policy exception is a narrow one that involves notions of 
repugnance and matters that would “shock the conscience” of a reasonable New Zealander.152 
It is not contrary to New Zealand public policy to enforce a foreign judgment merely because 
the cause of action upon which the judgment is based is not known to New Zealand law, nor 
where the outcome of the case would have been different under New Zealand law.153 The 
categories of cases where a foreign judgment would be unenforceable on the basis that it was 
contrary to public policy are not closed, however some pertinent examples from the cases 
include: 
                                               
149 See footnotes 136-146. Presumably this ground envisaged a situation where the Australian judgment had (by 
omission) been registered by relevant court registry staff in breach of the Act e.g. the judgment was not final or 
conclusive, or had not been registered in the prescribed form.  
150This ground covers what is colloquially known as the Moçambique rule, from the House of Lords decision in 
British South Africa Co v Companhia de Moçambique [1893] AC 602 (HL). This rule provides hat a court 
generally has no jurisdiction to determine matters of title to, or possession of, immovable property (primarily 
land) located outside its jurisdiction. It’s inclusion in the s 61 (as a basis for challenging enforcement) is based 
on the federal nature of Australia legal system –the Moçambique rule has been abolished by statute in New 
South Wales, and partially abolished in the Australian Capital Territory. However, it is applied in the other 
Australian States and Territories, and in New Zealand. Consequently it was kept in the legislation in order to 
recognise the (partial) divergence between the two countries in terms of the status of the Moçambique rule. Its 
application is relatively limited and would only prevent enforcement where the subject-matter of the judgment 
was the property itself (and that property was not located in Australia at the time of the original proceedings), 
rather than subsequent attempts to seek enforcement of a judgment sum against that property.   
151 Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgment Act 1934, s 6 
152 Lane v Questnet Ltd [2010] NZAR 210 (HC), Reeves v OneWorld Challenge [2006] 2 NZLR 184 (HC) at 
[67].  
153 Phrantes v Argenti [1960] 2 QB 19, Reeves v OneWorld Challenge, above n 152, at [56].  
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a) a judgment was held unenforceable where a creditor had sought registration of a 
judgment for a sum in excess of lawful entitlement under the original judgment;154 
b) a judgment was enforced where it had been irregularly obtained in the Solomon 
Islands (excessive damages award for breach of contract), albeit the defendant had 
absconded from the jurisdiction with the subject-matter of the dispute and the court 
addressed required him to purge his contempt prior to re-assessing the damages 
awarded;155 
c) a  default judgment was enforced where it was alleged the defendant had not received 
adequate notice (in Hong Kong) of the proposed hearing date;156 and  
d) a judgment was enforced where the liable party sought to have the judgment set aside 
on the basis that the current legal system of Fiji (where the judgement had been 
granted) was an unlawful one without credibility (having resulted from a military 
coup).157 
As will be evident from the above examples, the public policy exception to enforcement has 
been interpreted relatively strictly in New Zealand, and a consistent theme in the cases above 
is the unwillingness of New Zealand courts to refuse enforcement in all but the most extreme 
of fact scenarios.  
How then does this compare to the position prior to the inception of the Trans-Tasman 
Proceedings Act 2010 (NZ)? As noted earlier, the applicable legislation for the enforcement 
of Australian judgements was the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgment Act 1934.158 
Compared to that Act, the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (NZ) jettisons almost all the 
familiar private international law criteria for enforcement of judgments in the Trans-Tasman 
context. In particular, there is no jurisdiction requirement,159 and the only defence to 
                                               
154 Dymock v Bilbie (1999) 13 PRNZ 158 (HC).  
155 Bolton v Marine Services Ltd, above n 122.  
156 Lane v Questnet Ltd, above n 152.  
157 Abe v Azim HC Auckland CIV 2010-40403741, 4 April 2011.  
158 Australian judgments were treated as any other foreign judgment prior to the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 
2010 (NZ), see Mortensen, above n 2, at 62-66. Australian judgments can also be enforced at common law in 
New Zealand (see Goddard and McLachlan , above n 25, at 58-68). For present purposes it is sufficient to note 
that the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgment Act 1934 (NZ) (to a large extent) codified the common law 
principles relating to enforcement of foreign judgments in New Zealand, and provided a streamlined procedural 
process for enforcement where New Zealand had reciprocal enforcement arrangements in place with the forum 
which issued the judgment e.g. under the Act, separate proceedings to sue on the judgment do not need to be 
initiated, whereas at common law the entitled party had to sue on the judgment as a new cause of action  (see 
Goddard and McLachlan , above n 25, at 70).  
159 Under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgment Act 1934, a foreign judgment could only be enforced where 
the original court had jurisdiction to hear the case (s 6(1)(b). Section 6(3)(a)-(c) sets out a list of circumstances 
when the foreign court will be deemed to have jurisdiction for the purposes of enforcement under the Act e.g. 
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enforcement is that enforcement would be contrary to public policy (in the narrow sense 
discussed above).160 The basic idea is that any issues the judgment debtor wishes to raise in 
relation to jurisdiction, natural justice, or fraud, should be raised in the original court rather 
than the enforcement proceedings. Therefore an Australian civil judgment, which was 
obtained under the domestic private international law of Australia, becomes readily 
enforceable throughout New Zealand against the assets of the foreign defendant, in 
circumstances where the defendant has been unable to avail themselves of the “more 
appropriate court” test in s 19 of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth).161 
III The Outer World Problem: A Problem at All?  
 
A Introduction 
 
It is relatively clear that the outer problem is present under the TTPA scheme. The question 
then becomes, is it actually problem? This requires a clear articulation of where unfairness 
arises under the outer world problem, and, to what extent counter arguments balance this 
unfairness. Accordingly, it is logical to address these issues with reference to the parties and 
their perspectives on the to the outer world problem.162 Ultimately it is argued that a 
                                                                                                                                                  
submitting to the jurisdiction through voluntary appearance in the proceedings, or if the defendant was also a 
plaintiff or counterclaimed in the original proceedings, see Goddard and McLachlan , above n 25,  at 77-80). In 
contrast, the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) does not specify any jurisdictional requirements before 
the foreign judgment can becomes enforceable in New Zealand, in the case of foreign defendants. As noted 
earlier, the legislation makes no distinction as to whether the streamlined enforcement process applies under the 
Act, with reference to how the court issuing the judgment determined what the appropriate forum was to hear 
the dispute prior to issuing the judgment (i.e. whether this was assessed under Australia’s private international 
law or section 19 of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth)).  
160 Compare Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010, s 61(2)(a)-(c).  
161 See footnotes 57-61.  
162 The states interest in the outer world problem  (i.e. Australia and New Zealand) are of course relevant, but in 
the present case is difficult to ascertain as at an institutional level there appears to have been a complete failure 
to consider the implications of the enforcement regime applying to judgments against non-market parties (see 
Trans-Tasman Working Group, Trans-Tasman Court Proceedings and Regulatory Enforcement: A Report by 
the Trans-Tasman Working Group (Attorney General’s Department (Australia) Ministry of Justice (New 
Zealand), December 2006) at 7-8, Trans-Tasman Working Group, Trans-Tasman Court Proceedings and 
Regulatory Enforcement: A Public Discussion Paper by the Trans-Tasman Working Group (Attorney General’s 
Department (Australia) Ministry of Justice (New Zealand), August 2005), at 1, Trans-Tasman Proceedings Bill 
105-2 (select-committee report) at 1, (23 March 2010)  661 NZPD 9702,  (18 March 2010)  CAPD 2215 (Cth)). 
In fact it is likely that under established private international law principles such as international comity, both 
Australian and New Zealand governments should have refused to support an initiative which purports to allow 
one state in the common market to exercise excessive jurisdiction against foreign nationals and then enforce any 
resulting judgment freely throughout the common market, as such an initiative fails to recognise that Australian 
courts cannot have unlimited jurisdiction, as this offends the sovereignty and interests of other nations and the 
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significant degree of unfairness arises for the defendant, and that this is not outweighed by 
counter-arguments about the benefits the current state of the law has for plaintiffs. 
B The Foreign Defendant’s Perspective  
 
How then does the issue of unfairness arise towards foreign defendant under the outer world 
problem? The issue of the outer world problem obviously necessitates some assumptions, 
because of the interrelating steps via which the problem is manifested.163 These are outlined 
below:  
a) it is assumed that a common market plaintiff has commenced proceedings against a 
non-common market defendant in an Australian court;  
b) it is assumed the dispute between the parties has a close connection with another 
dispute, in that it strongly arguable that it should be heard in that forum;  
c) it is assumed that the Australian court retains the proceedings despite an application 
for a stay, and then enters judgment in favour of the plaintiff; and  
d) it is assumed that the foreign defendant has assets in New Zealand as well as 
Australia.  
In the above scenario, at a practical level, the issue for the foreign defendant is clearly one of 
enforcement of the Australian judgment, which can be easily and quickly enforced in New 
Zealand, subject to few grounds of challenge. This allows the plaintiff to quickly access 
assets of the foreign defendant which are present in both Australia, and more importantly, 
New Zealand under the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (NZ). There is nothing 
inherently unfair about this, on the face of it. As Mortensen notes, the rationale for expedited 
enforcement of foreign judgments is to reduce economic barriers to trade through reciprocal 
arrangements between the states located within the common market.164 This is able to occur 
                                                                                                                                                  
principle of international comity (see Gray, above n 39, at 209,  Collins, above n 73, at 5-6). If the scheme did 
not apply to the resulting judgment, then arguably this does not offend the principle of comity as before the 
resulting judgment could be enforced in New Zealand, the plaintiff would need to establish that the Australian 
court had proportionate jurisdiction (within the meaning of s 6 of the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 
1934) to hear the claim before enforcing any resulting judgment.  
163 For example, it is not guaranteed that in a case where the Australian court retains the proceedings, judgment 
will be entered in favour of the plaintiff. However one of the key issues under the outer world problem is the 
enforcement of the judgment within the common market. This merely illustrates the multiple steps of the 
problem, and on the likelihood of it occurring.  
164 See Reid Mortensen, “Autochthonous Essential: State Courts and a Cooperative National Scheme of Civil 
Jurisdiction” (2003) 22 U Tas LR 109, at 109.  
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because the states located within the common market can have confidence in the level of 
justice which will be obtained by the parties in other states, particularly with respect to the 
issue of jurisdiction exercised by other states within the common market:165   
“… a willingness to let court’ judgments ‘circulate’ freely over internal borders in a 
multistate area also suggests confidence that those courts exercise proportionate civil 
jurisdictions that are acceptable…” 
To what extent then (from the foreign defendant’s perspective), can they have confidence that 
a judgment obtained in Australia was based on a “proportionate” exercise of civil 
jurisdiction? The answer would appear to be little, if any.  Jurisdiction in this context includes 
not only the ability of the court to hear and determine the matter at issue between the parties, 
but also order a stay on the basis that the dispute is more closely connected with some other 
forum.166 The highlights of the earlier review include that:  
a) in general, Australian courts are much more willing to retain proceedings commenced 
within the jurisdiction against a foreign defendant, even where there is a strong 
argument the dispute is more closely connected with another forum. Conversely they 
are much less willing to grant a stay in such circumstances;167 
b) in forum non conveniens cases, the clearly inappropriate test in Voth starts from the 
presumption that Australia is an appropriate forum to hear the dispute, and requires 
the court addressed to effectively ignore the appropriateness of another forum which 
may be more closely connected with the dispute, to the disadvantage of the foreign 
defendant;168  
c) in exclusive choice of court agreement cases, the wide residual discretion to refuse a 
stay under Akai, and the institutional level bias which is seemingly apparent in the 
Australian judiciary will generally mean that in cases where the agreement dictates a 
foreign court as the chosen forum, Australian courts will refuse to grant a stay if an 
Australian plaintiff commences proceedings in Australia. Conversely, foreign 
defendant’s are unlikely to be able to avail themselves of a similar discretion when it 
                                               
165 Ibid.  
166 In the context of Australia this would include provisions in court rules which allow for service outside of the 
jurisdiction, as well as established forum non conveniens principles such as the “clearly inappropriate” test for a 
stay in the Australian High Court decision in Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd.  
167Footnote 62.   
168 Footnotes 93-96.   
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comes to challenging an exclusive choice of court clause dictating Australia as the 
more appropriate forum;169 and  
d) in non-exclusive choice of court agreement cases, such clauses are likely to be 
determinative of the issue of a stay, with Australian courts using a submission clause 
as an overriding factor to refuse granting a stay, despite the fact such a clause is one 
factor to be considered in all the circumstances of the case. Anomalously, a similar 
approach is not taken where an Australian resident has submitted to the jurisdiction of 
a foreign court.170   
The concept of proportionate civil jurisdiction underlies the hesitancy of one state to enforce 
the judgments of another, namely that one court will only wish to enforce the judgment of 
another in circumstances where it would have also entertained the claim. And the exercise of 
proportionate jurisdiction highlights one of the key underlying themes of private international 
law, namely, that the law should ensure the legitimate expectations of the parties are met 
when it comes to the question of where their legal dispute are resolved.171 In the present 
context, it is unfair for the judgment to be enforced throughout the common market because it 
is obtained under a legal regime (i.e. the private international law of Australia) which is 
patently biased towards retaining proceedings commenced within that jurisdiction. It is unfair 
because the basis upon which enforcement can occur under the Trans-Tasman Proceedings 
Act 2010 (NZ) is the private international law of Australia, which is self-evidently not 
proportionate when compared to the arrangements made for disputes which fall within the 
scope of the TTPA scheme.  
To a large extent the relevant legal tests under Australian law (as summarised above) fail to 
account for the interests of the foreign defendant in where the dispute has heard, and 
ultimately, ensure that the possibility of judgment being handed down in Australia will then 
becoming speedily enforceable in New Zealand under the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 
2010 (NZ). The unfairness therefore arises from the circumstances of enforcement,172 and the 
                                               
169 Footnotes 97-128.   
170 Footnotes 131-134. It should be noted that non-exclusive choice of court agreements fall outside of the scope 
of the outer world problem, as element three is not satisfied (i.e. compared to the TTPA arrangements, it is 
unclear that a different outcome in terms of a stay would be achieved, especially in light of the paternalism 
towards protecting local plaintiff’s interest, shown by Australian courts). However this fact scenario is still 
worth mentioning as it corroborates the point being made, namely Australian courts have a tendency to exercise 
excessive civil jurisdiction over non-Australian defendants.  
171 Collins, above n 73, at 4-5.  
172 I.e. where the Australian court has exercised excessive jurisdiction (e.g. retaining a case where there is little 
to no connection with Australia, and ignoring or failing to adequately take account of the foreign defendant’s 
interests in having their dispute heard in another forum).  
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discriminatory treatment of the defendant. The TTPA regime is clearly discriminatory, as it 
applies different tests based on the nationality of the defendant when it comes to the issue of 
jurisdiction (thereby disadvantaging them), yet fails to take this into account when it comes to 
the question of enforcing the resulting judgment.173 Put another way, it does not appear to be 
unfair to expect that a foreign defendant who is served with proceedings in Australia is able 
to avail themselves of the more proportionate test under s 19 of the Trans-Tasman 
Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth), if any resulting judgment will be enforceable in New Zealand 
under the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (NZ).  
Again at a practical level, unfairness can be seen by identifying that in some cases (involving 
a foreign defendant), if the dispute had been subjected to a different test (e.g. Spiliada, or s 19 
of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth)), the dispute may well have never been 
retained by the Australian courts, with the result that the plaintiff would have been required to 
seek judgment elsewhere (with the resulting judgment not being automatically enforceable in 
New Zealand).174 This would all appear to be palatably unfair to the foreign defendant, with 
little justification other than the benefits obtained by the plaintiff.  
C Plaintiff’s Perspective  
 
The plaintiff’s perspective of the outer world problem is obviously a positive one. Again this 
is the corollary of the ease in which they may access the assets of the defendant in New 
Zealand. Consequently, suing in Australia may be seen as a juridical  advantage for the 
plaintiff, as under the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (NZ), they will be able to easily 
enforce any resulting Australian judgment under that legislation in New Zealand, and thereby 
access any assets the defendant has in New Zealand (in addition to those located in 
Australia).   
                                               
173 For example the ICCPR provides in article 26 that “All persons are equal before the law and are entitled 
without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any 
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground 
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth 
or other status (emphasis added).” see International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights GA Res 2200A XXI 
(1966), art 26. Arguably the TTPA is discriminatory in this sense as it does not treat parties equally, 
discriminating as to whether the party is local to the common market or not.  
174 As Garnett notes, there is a strong possibility in many of the Australian forum non conveniens cases, a 
different outcome may well have resulted if the court had applied a more balanced test (e.g. the Spiliada test for 
a stay), see R Garnett, above n 68 . Similar points may be made with reference to the current state of law with 
reference to choice of court agreements.  
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The case is clearly one of forum shopping then, namely the plaintiff’s perspective of the outer 
world problem is that the ability to sue in Australia and utilise the reciprocal enforcement 
regimes present between the two countries is a logical advantage of suing in Australia, and 
the plaintiff should not be criticised for this.175 The advantage is that any resulting judgment 
will be easily and quickly enforceable in New Zealand, as well as Australia. Conversely, if 
the plaintiff had sued in another forum, any judgment would have had to have been enforced 
in New Zealand, at common law or under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 
1934. In assessing the alleged unfairness for the defendant, this must be balanced against the 
advantages the current state of the law provides the local plaintiff.  
To a large extent, whether the plaintiff’s perspective is justified depends on ones view on 
forum shopping. One of the key issues that most academics identify with forum shopping is 
that the outcome of a case should not vary depending upon which forum it is litigated in.176 
This is the case under the TTPA (i.e. if proceedings were litigated in other forum, then the 
expedient process for enforcement of the Australian judgment in New Zealand combined 
with the high probability that proceedings would be retained if commenced in Australia 
would potentially not be present in another forum). Juenger makes the point that such an 
argument is absurdly premised on the idea that all states and nations adopt a uniform system 
of private international law for allocating disputes.177 Juenger argues that the focus on 
attaining “decisional harmony” (or uniformity) detracts from what should be the key focus of 
private international law, namely furthering the ends of material judgment.178 This point is 
accepted, but as Lord Denning once aptly said, in the context of forum shopping for personal 
injury claimants in America; “The Plaintiff holds all the cards.”179 Extrapolating this 
comment to apply to forum shopping as a concept more generally, it is the plaintiff’s interests 
whom are materially furthered, as they can elect which forum to commence proceedings in, 
with the defendant always being required to react. In some cases allowing a plaintiff to forum 
                                               
175 See The Atlantic Star [1973] 1 QB 364 at 381-382, per Lord Simon Glaisdale ““Forum-shopping” is a dirty 
word; but it is only a perjorative way of saying that, if you offer a plaintiff a choice of jurisdictions, he will 
naturally choose the one in which he thinks his case can be most favourably presented: this should be a matter 
neither for surprise nor for indignation.”   
176Juenger, above n 30, at 6.  
177 Ibid at 7. The point being made here is that the divergence in different private international law rules for 
issues such as characterisation (i.e. classifying the legal relationship for the purpose of determining the 
appropriate forums law to apply to them), and connecting factors (i.e. ascertaining which forum has the closest 
connection with the dispute), and how common this is across many jurisdictions, highlights the illusory nature 
of hope for world-wide agreement, for the purpose of discouraging forum shopping. Consequently dismissing 
forum shopping as a disreputable practice which should be discouraged by the law is naïve as it presupposes that 
global law will one day be in a position to obviate its need, when all evidence points to the contrary. 
178 Ibid at 11.  
179 Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd v Bloch [1983] 2 All ER 72 at 74 (CA).  
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shop may be laudable, but it is submitted that it must always be balanced against the interests 
of both parties to a legal dispute rather than just one (i.e. the plaintiffs).  
A greater need to balance the party’s interests is clearly needed in the case of the outer world 
problem under the TTPA. The plaintiff is able to commence proceedings in Australia, and 
even where the dispute has a strong connection with another forum, ultimately have those 
proceedings retained even where there is a strong argument the dispute is more closely 
connected with another forum. This is a direct result of the current state of Australia’s private 
international law and the inapplication of the forum allocation test in s 19 of the Trans-
Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (NZ). The outcome is that the resulting judgment is then 
enforceable relatively easily and with little scope for challenge throughout the common 
market. One might say this furthers the interests of the plaintiff, but can it be said that it 
furthers the interests of justice? Such a one-sided view of forum shopping (and the outer 
world problem) is unacceptable.  
For example is it so detrimental to the interests of the plaintiff to require it to litigate disputes 
in a forum where it had agreed to litigate the dispute, had submitted to the law of that 
jurisdiction, and where most of the evidence was located?180 The common theme under 
Australian private international law is that Australian plaintiffs are often not required to 
litigate disputes in forums which are (objectively) much more closely connected with their 
dispute. It would appear to be positively fair to require them to litigate disputes in such a 
forum. In terms of the question of the enforceability of any judgment obtained in that forum, 
the party would then likely to be required to enforce the foreign judgement under s 6 of the 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgment Act 1934 or at common law.181 One of the key 
requirements would be that, under s 6, the court had jurisdiction to hear the parties’ 
dispute.182 Ironically there is no such requirement under the TTPA with respect to judgments 
obtained against foreign defendants, despite the underlying rationale of a reciprocal judgment 
enforcement scheme (which is that the court enforcing the judgment can have confidence that 
it would also have heard the claim which resulted in judgment).183 It is ironic because the 
TTPA is predicated on this principle – this can be seen from the uniform jurisdictional test for 
forum allocation contained in s 19 of, so that the New Zealand court can have confidence in 
                                               
180 The example used here is from the earlier decision of Lewis Construction v Tichauer, above n 109.  
181 Goddard and McLachlan , above n 25,  at 68-88 
182 Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgment Act 1934, s 6(1)(b), Goddard and McLachlan , above n 25,  at 68-88.  
183 See footnote 165. The point being made here is that the drafters of the TTPA scheme gave no thought to the 
issue of how non-common market resident disputes (or where one party is a non-resident) would fit into the 
scheme of the TTPA, see materials cited at footnote 29.  
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enforcing any resulting Australian judgment.184 But as has been argued, this does not apply in 
cases where one of the parties is a foreign defendant.  
When viewed this way, there would appear to be a compelling argument that the plaintiff 
should not be entitled to the advantage of being able to enforce a judgment in New Zealand 
which resulted from a different jurisdictional test to that contained within the common market 
arrangement. The position of enforcement of a judgment which resulted from the s 19 test in 
the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth), and under the private international law of 
Australia is not analogous because the former creates a more proportionate jurisdiction 
whereas the latter is not. This undermines the entire purpose of establishing a uniform test for 
jurisdiction under the scheme (which is to facilitate inter-state confidence about the nature of 
cross-border judgments being enforced), as well as causing a palatable unfairness to the 
foreign defendant. Ultimately it would appear to be better to focus on more complex analysis 
of these advantages rather than taking broad principled based arguments (such as those raised 
by Juenger) with reference to forum shopping. Although valid arguments, they fail to address 
the specific issues raised by the outer world problem and whether the plaintiff should be 
entitled to forum shop for such advantages. Ultimate it is argued the plaintiff’s perspective 
should does not impact on the significant unfairness which arises for the defendant under the 
outer world problem. 
D Choice of Court Agreements  
 
The final point with reference to fairness to the defendant under the outer world problem is 
the issue of choice of court agreement, where the dispute involves a commercial contract. 
This issue can be dealt with relatively quickly. The argument (as discussed somewhat 
analogously in the context of whether Australia’s private international law is biased), would 
be that the defendant cannot seriously complain of any juridical advantage the plaintiff can 
obtain as a result of suing in Australia, where they have elected  this as the exclusive forum to 
hear any dispute arising under the contract. However, this ignores the reality of the current 
state of Australia’s private international law and the different types of clauses which can be 
used in a commercial contract.  
                                               
184 See Mortensen, above n 2, at 90-91.   
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Where there is an exclusive choice of court agreement dictating Australia as the chosen 
forum, foreign defendant’s will generally be unable to avail themselves of the wide discretion 
allowing the court to refuse to enforce such agreements because of the paternalistic approach 
Australian courts take to protecting the interests of local residents from being required to sue 
or be sued abroad.185 In cases where the exclusive choice of court agreement dictates a 
foreign forum as having exclusive jurisdiction, there is a strong possibility that the court will 
refuse to enforce it.186 The result is that any argument that it is fair to expect the defendant to 
live with the consequences of electing Australia as the appropriate forum in a choice of court 
agreement (e.g. the ability for their assets in New Zealand to be expediently seized by the 
plaintiff) are countered by the fact that the current state of Australia’s private international 
law is discriminatory. If the foreign defendant was a local resident, there is a strong 
possibility they would be judicially assisted in escaping from their earlier bargain to litigate 
any dispute arising under the contract in Australia. Conversely in the very case where the 
defendant has elected a foreign forum, which will supposedly avoid them being subjected to 
this particular procedural disadvantage, an Australian court will likely refuse to enforce the 
agreement. The outcome is that cannot seriously be said to be fair to require the defendant to 
accept enforcement against its assets in New Zealand, where the treatment of the relevant 
agreement is either discriminatory,187 or in other cases generally rendered unenforceable.188   
 
IV Conclusion and Reform  
 
A Introduction   
 
Accepting that the outer world problem is in fact “a problem”, the logical question then 
becomes, what is the solution? A wide-canvassing discussion in potential reform options is 
beyond the scope of this paper but some potential options are discussed briefly below, as well 
as potential difficulties that would arise with such a solution to the outer world problem. This 
                                               
185 See footnotes 125-130.  
186 See footnotes 97-124.   
187 I.e. where the parties have elected Australia as the chosen forum in their choice of court agreement.  
188 I.e. where the parties have elected a foreign forum as the chosen place to litigate their dispute. As noted 
earlier non-exclusive choice of court agreements have been omitted from the present discussion as they arguably 
do not fall within the definition of the outer world problem (see footnotes 131-134).  
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has also been done specifically with reference to the issue of commercial contractual disputes 
as well.   
B Amend the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth), s 19 
 
The current unfairness to the defendant under the TTPA and the outer world problem arises 
because the proportionate jurisdictional test in s 19, does not apply unless both the parties are 
common market parties. Enforcement of the resulting judgment in New Zealand (the practical 
reason the foreign defendant is concerned with the outer world problem) is ancillary, as it is 
effectively the circumstances of the judgments enforcement which is where the real 
unfairness arises.189 Consequently, one potential solution could be to reform the Trans-
Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) / (NZ),190 so that applications for a stay govern both 
cases involving common market parties, as well as cases where one (or even both) parties are 
located outside of the common market. This would mean any resulting judgment was 
obtained under a significantly more proportionate jurisdictional test than that currently in 
place under the Australian test in Voth, and would remove any claim the foreign defendant 
could make that they have been treated unfairly when such a judgment becomes readily 
enforceable throughout the common market.  
A number of issues arise with this solution. Firstly, the underlying purpose of the 
Christchurch Agreement was (despite some confusion around terminology) to establish a 
reciprocal enforcement judgment regime for disputes between common market parties.191 
Although this point is somewhat complicated by the Trans-Tasman Working Groups refusal 
to adopt the Brussels model used in the European Union (i.e. limiting the application of the 
cross-enforcement scheme to those domiciled within the common market), and the focus 
placed on service rather than some other connecting factor or concept, it is clear that the 
                                               
189 The judgment having resulted from an Australian court exercising excessive jurisdiction.  
190 The focus of this paper has been on the outer world problem as it arises from proceedings commenced in 
Australia, with the resulting judgment being then enforced under the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (NZ) 
(see footnote 42). Arguably the problem does not arise in New Zealand under its current law (the more 
proportionate test in Spiliada), however the author has not extensively reviewed the relevant case law with 
respect to choice of court agreements and their position under New Zealand law. Common law countries are 
notorious for their forum biased approach to cases where proceedings have been served out of the jurisdiction 
(see Gray, above n 39, at 208-209), therefore the better approach (and consistent with the reciprocal nature of 
the TTPA scheme) would be to reform both pieces of legislation consistently to apply to cases heard in Australia 
and New Zealand. References to the Australian legislation should also be read as referring to the equivalent 
provision in this discussion of reform.   
191 See footnote 29.  
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intention behind the TTPA scheme was to limit its application to parties that had a close 
connection with Australia or New Zealand.192 Consequently amending the legislation to apply 
to non-common market parties would appear to fly in the face of the underlying purpose of 
scheme, albeit there appears to be no legal reason for this to not be possible.193 An additional 
concern would be clearly articulating the scope of the application of the test in s 19, and this 
is especially so in light of the Trans-Tasman Working Group’s refusal to use concepts such as 
domicile or residence.194 One potential solution could be to provide s 19 governs cases for a 
stay where the foreign defendant is served outside of the common market. This would 
remove any incentives for the defendant to be served within or out of the common market,195 
although the wording in s 17 and s 19 would need to be amended to make it clear that the 
court could order a stay in favour of not only an Australian or a New Zealand court, but any 
other forum the foreign defendant wished to argue was the more appropriate court to hear the 
dispute. Another issue (one which will not be addressed until further case law has developed), 
is whether Australian courts will continue their biased approach to applications for a stay 
under ss 17 / 19 of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth). This may well be possible, 
as the test is for a stay under s 17 / 19 is effectively a discretionary one with a number of 
factors being listed in section 19 and it being left up to the court how they are weighed up in 
any given case.  
C Realign the Private International Law of Australia and New Zealand  
 
Another solution could be to mandate the application of the test for a stay, as provided for in 
the House of Lords decision in Spiliada, under Australian private international law.  This 
would require either judicial over-ruling by the Australian High Court of the test from Voth, 
                                               
192 See footnotes 29, 42-61. This would also seem to be relevant when arguing whether judgments against non-
common market residents falls within the scope of the expedited enforcement regime under the TTPA, however 
as noted earlier (see footnote 146)  the legislation  makes no distinction as to the party against whom the 
judgment is made and it would effectively require additional words to be read into  
193 It would also be likely that such a solution would be rejected by both Australian and New Zealand 
governments due to the absence of reciprocal enforcement arrangements with many other foreign nations, on the 
basis that they may well not have similar propionate tests for exercising jurisdiction over non-residents.   
194 Trans-Tasman Working Group, Trans-Tasman Court Proceedings and Regulatory Enforcement: A Public 
Discussion Paper by the Trans-Tasman Working Group (Attorney General’s Department (Australia) Ministry of 
Justice (New Zealand), August 2005) 
195 Currently serving the defendant outside of the common market means the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 
2010 (Cth), s 19, will not apply to the dispute and it will be governed by the private international law of 
Australia. This creates an incentive for the plaintiff to serve proceedings outside of the common market as when 
the defendant has to seek a stay it is not possible for them to make an application under the Trans-Tasman 
Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth), ss 17, 19.  
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or legislative abolishment.  This would again address the issues around excessive jurisdiction 
and the resulting circumstances of enforcement and fairness for the foreign defendant, as the 
Australian court would be required to apply a much more proportionate jurisdictional test 
than that currently provided for under Australian private international law. This would also 
avoid issues around amending the TTPA scheme to apply to non-common market defendants 
discussed above, and would also seem to address the underlying cause of the outer world 
problem under the TTPA scheme, which is Australia’s private internat ional law.196 Again this 
solution does not address issues that under Spiliada, the wide discretion (in the form of a list 
of factors to be taken into account when considering an application for a stay) conferred on 
Australian courts may be equally abused and result in similar outcomes as those which are 
occurring under the clearly inappropriate test under Voth.  
Finally Spiliada itself has been subjected to vehement criticism in some academic circles, it 
being noted that the test for a stay under Spiliada provides for “…judicial discretion so broad 
and so vaguely circumscribed as to amount to an ‘instinctive process’”.197 This clearly 
impacts on commercial certainty and the ability of the parties to predict where their dispute 
will be heard (in the absence of a choice of court agreement in the case of commercial 
contractual disputes). Conversely it also allows the court to react to the facts of individual 
cases, and provide a fairer outcome when deciding the issue of forum. This criticism 
therefore references the competing interests of the common law to, on the one hand, create 
legal certainty based on a precedent-based system, and on the other, retain sufficient 
discretion so as ensure that fairness may be achieved in individual cases.198 
 Cleary this is a matter of balance and where that balance should be drawn will necessarily be 
contextual. In the present case however there is a good argument that the test under Voth 
creates certain if not just outcomes (i.e. proceedings will generally be retained in Australia), 
whereas the test under Spiliada is less certain but has greater capacity to create a fair outcome 
in specific fact scenarios. Or put another way, certainty of outcome under Voth is traded for 
fairness towards one of the parties. In terms of reform, s 19 is clearly more aligned with the 
test in Spiliada so these criticisms may equally be levelled at that test also.  Ultimately a 
discussion between both governments about which approach is better suited to the unique 
                                               
196 The problem under the TTPA is that it fails to apply at the jurisdictional stage, but does when it comes to 
enforcement. This lacuna means the foreign defendant is then subjected to Australia’s private international law.  
197 D W Roberson “Forum Non Conveniens in America and England: ‘A Rather Fantastic Fiction’” (1987) 103 
LQR 398, 414.  
198 Gray, above n 39, at 204.  
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social, commercial, and legal environment of the common market needs to be carried out, 
with reference to wider considerations such as the interests of non-market defendants as well. 
This wider discussion seems to have been absent leading up to the inception of the TTPA 
scheme, as evidenced from the background public documentation available.199  
D Remove Judgments Against Foreign Defendants from the TTPA 
 
The better approach would appear to be to remove the ability of the plaintiff to enforce the 
judgments obtained against non-market residents under the TTPA altogether, and require 
them to be enforced in New Zealand at common law or under the Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Judgments Act 1934. This would ameliorate the key concern the foreign defendant has under 
the outer world problem (ease of enforcement of the Australian judgment in New Zealand, 
based on excessive jurisdiction), and would avoid other issues such as reforming the Trans-
Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth), s 19, to apply to non-common market defendants or 
determining what is the most appropriate test to be applied in common market cases in stay 
applications. Although this would not remove the issues around bias in Australian private 
international law, it would likely mean that judgments against foreign defendants rendered 
under Australian jurisdictional rules (including the test in Voth) would be unenforceable in 
New Zealand at common law or under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 
1934.200 This addresses the key concern of enforcement for the foreign defendant, albeit it 
potentially fails to address concerns the state might have in removing this advantage for the 
plaintiff.201 
 
                                               
199 See footnote 29.  
200 Generally at common law or under the Act, “jurisdiction” for the purposes of enforcement of a foreign 
judgment in New Zealand requires the defendant in the original court proceedings to have either been served 
within the jurisdiction or to have submitted it to it via appearance which constitutes submission to the 
jurisdiction of the court  (e.g. filing documents for the purpose of defending the substantive proceedings, as 
opposed to merely appearing for the purpose of applying for a stay, or submitting to the jurisdiction of the 
relevant courts through a non-exclusive choice of court agreement). Under Australian court rules (see footnotes 
…) and the test for a stay in Voth, generally jurisdiction will be established where the case falls within the 
categories which allow for out of jurisdiction service without leave (e.g. the contract was entered into in 
Australia) or the court grants leave for service, and the Australian court determines it is not a “clearly 
inappropriate” forum to hear the dispute. Consequently in many cases where  an Australian court has 
jurisdiction to hear the dispute, such cases will correspondingly not satisfy the enforcement requirements under 
New Zealand common law or the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1934 because of lack of 
jurisdiction within the meaning of those schemes (see Goddard and McLachlan , above n 25,  at 68-88).  
201 See footnote 162.  
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E Choice of Court Agreements  
 
In the case of choice of court agreements, it is suggested that the best approach is for both 
Australia and New Zealand to ratify and incorporate the Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements. This would remove the unfairness in terms of the current approach 
Australian courts take to exclusive choice of court agreements, and align (to a large 
extent),202 Australia’s private international law with the TTPA scheme which has expressly 
adopted the Hague Convention approach of primacy to the parties choice of court 
agreement.203 This would mean any judgment resulting from an Australian decision on the 
enforcement of a choice of court agreement would be based on principles of private ordering 
and holding the parties to their bargain, as opposed to the current practice in Australia, which 
is paternalism and protecting the interests of local residents over those of foreign defendants. 
Heavily circumscribing the discretion Australian courts have under their current private 
international law would heavily mitigate issues of unfairness to the defendant, such as 
discriminatory treatment when it comes to releasing them from an Australian choice of court 
clause, or ensuring that they are not subjected to enforcement in New Zealand where it has 
been expressly agreed that a foreign court should have exclusive jurisdiction over the 
dispute.204  
F Conclusion  
 
Australia’s-private-international-law (the-applicable-law-where the-case involves a foreign 
defendant), combined with the current TTPA regime creates the paradigm outer world 
problem present under other common market arrangements. Generally Australian courts will 
be more willing to retain proceedings commenced in the jurisdiction (even in breach of a 
choice of court clause), with the potential to pass judgment, which then becomes readily 
enforceable in both Australia and New Zealand. Depending on whose perspective this is 
looked at from, materially influences whether the outer world problem is a “problem” in the 
                                               
202 There are some differences between the Hague Convention and the wording of the TTPA scheme (e.g. see 
Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth), s 20), see footnote 161).  
203 See footnote 161.  
204 See footnotes 98-125.  
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sense that reform is justified. The foreign defendant’s perspective would appear to be the 
more compelling one when compared to the plaintiff’s view, as the TTPA scheme is both 
discriminatory and dismissive of the defendant’s interests when it comes to the issue of 
enforcing the resulting judgment in Australia. In contrast the plaintiff is effectively forum 
shopping, and in the cases where it has been identified unfairness does arise for the defendant 
(e.g. where the dispute has a close connection with another forum) it does not seem 
unreasonable to require the plaintiff to litigate in a forum which is more closely connected 
with the dispute. To a large extent the outer world problem remains present under the TTPA 
scheme even where there is an exclusive choice of court clause present  under a commercial 
contract dispute (albeit the TTPA appears to fail to address issues with reference to non-
exclusive choice of court clauses). So does the unfairness for the foreign defendant in these 
circumstances. 
The more difficult question appears to be that of reform, namely which approach is best to 
ameliorate the unfairness which arises from allowing an Australian judgment obtained under 
its excessive jurisdiction to be quickly enforced in New Zealand, and even if reform is 
justified merely because the outer world problem is unfair on the defendant. The better 
approach would appear to be to remove judgments against non-common market residents 
from the expedited enforcement regime under the TTPA, and for Australia and New Zealand 
to ratify the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. Whether the issue identified 
in this paper will garner sufficient interest from academics and other interested parties to 
encourage reform yet remains unclear. Additionally there is a possibility that the scenario 
where the outer world problem is present may never occur in the form of a litigated case or 
reported decision.205  As Mortensen notes, arguably the outer world problem under the TTPA 
scheme is a less significant issue from an international perspective (as compared to other 
more significant common market arrangements such as the European Union Brussels model, 
where the outer world problem is also an issue).206 Nevertheless it is just as objectionable on 
the grounds of principle. At the very least further discussion around the potential for the 
problem to arise should have occurred prior to the inception of the Christchurch Agreement 
and the incorporating legislation – this is the least that non-common market defendants 
deserved.  
 
                                               
205 See footnote 163.  
206 Mortensen, above n 2, at 91.  
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